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ABSTRACT 
Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are known to have difficulties 
with pragmatic language. There is, however, a subpopulation of those with ASD that 
exhibits a high competency with pragmatic language. It can be difficult for researchers to 
find natural contexts to record these high-functioning individuals and examine their 
spontaneous use of pragmatic language. Additionally, there is a need to move beyond 
analyzing the cognitive abilities of these individuals to a sociolinguistic exploration of 
how they use pragmatic abilities to form and navigate social groups. 
The research involved in this thesis included audio-visual recordings of 14 high 
school students with ASD. These students were filmed during metaphor comprehension 
tests and tests requiring inferences about the mental states of story characters. Also, for 
four weeks naturally occurring conversations of students and faculty in a classroom were 
recorded during lunchtimes. I use Relevance Theory as a framework for discussing 
findings as it integrates aspects of the cognitive and the social contexts.  
I conclude that the abilities of students with ASD to understand and produce 
pragmatic phenomena such as metaphor and irony are better illustrated by naturally 
occurring interactions than by comprehension tests. Comparing the comprehension tests 
with lunchtime recordings, I claim that, just as uses of metaphor fall on a spectrum 
ranging from creative to conventional, so also do uses of irony, echo, pretense, banter and 
combinations thereof. Likewise, these uses of communication range from weak to strong. 
That is, utterances may produce multiple weak implicatures, or give a few strong 
xv 
explicatures. Student proficiency in using creative and weaker communication is not only 
an ability, but also manifests linguistic capital in the social practice. This linguistic 
capital is used by participants to establish the politic behavior for the emergent network 
of those with similar linguistic capital. It is also used to distance and exclude other 
students who are seen to lack the linguistic capital. The combination of creativity and 




 In the conclusion to Tim Wharton’s 2009 book, Pragmatics and Non-Verbal 
Communication, he indicates a possible direction for applying his findings: “One 
discipline to which the cognitive pragmatic framework outlined in this book might be 
fruitfully applied is sociolinguistics. In many ways, it is surprising that few attempts have 
been made in this direction” (192).  
 The cognitive pragmatic framework to which Wharton refers is a development of 
Relevance Theory with an expanded emphasis on non-verbal elements such as facial 
expressions, prosody, and gesture. Indeed, even as far back as 1997 Sperber and Wilson 
issued a call for applying Relevance Theory to the social sciences (1997). Wharton 
mentions a few researchers who have answered the call, and suggests another way that 
Relevance Theory might be applied to sociology (2009:193):  
[W]ork in discourse analysis and sociolinguistics often centres on social notions 
such as power relations and inequality, and examines how they are manifested, 
reinforced and even constructed by discourse. Approaching the sociolinguistic 
domain from a different perspective— that is, starting with the minds of the 
individuals who create the discourse, and treating macro-level sociolinguistic 
phenomena as resulting from an accumulation of individual micro-level acts— 
may yield interesting and worthwhile results.
2 
I attempt this approach in the present study of a community of high school students with 
ASD. It first explores at the micro-level the minds of the individual students, then 
explores how the micro-level acts lead to the macro-level social processes of forming, 
maintaining and avoiding relationships. The size of this community may not be 
considered “macro” in the sense that Wharton would hope for, as it is only as large as the 
community of students with ASD within the classroom and the nearby faculty. However, 
it is a community in which we can apply the cognitive pragmatic framework to 
sociolinguistics.  
In chapter 2 I give an overview of autism and pragmatic studies of autism. In 
chapter 3 I describe the methodology for my research. Chapter 4 gives an overview of 
Relevance Theory concepts that will be helpful in discussing the findings. Chapter 5 
discusses the results and limitations of the written metaphor and story tests. Chapter 6 
describes a variety of linguistic phenomena found in the lunchtime recordings. Chapter 7 
explains how the linguistic phenomena of chapter 6 manifest linguistic capital, used in 
the classroom to form and navigate social groups.  
 As suggested by the title of this thesis, the spectrums1 to be discussed include 
both the autism spectrum as well as the range of linguistic phenomena that appear in the 
                                                 
 
1 Though the Latin plural of “spectrum” is “spectra,” I prefer the anglicized alternative “spectrums” in 
honor of the students who were fond of neologisms such as “autisms” when referring to individuals with 
autism. This will be revisited in chapter 7.  
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data. Additionally, just as there are efforts to classify subgroups among the population of 
those with autism, there are also subgroups of linguistic phenomena that appear on 
spectrums. As for the third element of my alliterative title, these spectrums and subgroups 
are best discussed in the context of school-lunch. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
PRAGMATICS AND AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS  
 
2.1 Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
Autism is a neurological condition characterized by difficulties in social 
interaction and communication. Recently, both genetic and environmental factors have 
been found to contribute to it. There is a wide diversity of symptoms and characteristics 
from one individual to another. In the past, the diagnoses were broken up into groupings 
such as: autism, Rett’s, Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
(PDD-NOS), high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s Syndrome (AS). These 
distinctions were found to be inadequate. For example, according to the fourth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-4), the symptom of 
early language delay was thought to separate Asperger’s Syndrome from autism, but this 
proved to be inconsistent. The most recent edition, the DSM-5, has modified the 
definitions to make it all one spectrum: autism spectrum disorders.  
Though autism has long been recognized as a spectrum of disorders, it has not 
always been presented as undifferentiated as it is in the latest DSM. Because there is so 
much diversity, many multisite trials are failing in psychological and genetic studies. This 
indicates that there is still work to be done in uncovering subtypes. David G. Amaral at 
the University of California-Davis is investigating these subtypes with magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) of the brains of those with autism. He is among those 
attempting to “parse the complexity of autism into more homogenous subtypes” (2014 
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lecture). Though there is promise, at this point the tension between the spectrum and the 
subtypes is unresolved.  
With regard to the present study, most of the students are diagnosed as having AS 
or HFA, but even among these students there is great diversity. Some attend general (or 
honors) education classes independently, while others receive more direct attention from 
special education faculty. Some students regularly socialize with neurotypical friends, 
while others prefer to be alone. An individual student may even vary behaviors from day 
to day.  
For the purposes of this research, students were recorded and studied without 
being grouped by particular subtypes. I do not have access to an MRI machine, nor has 
anyone yet figured out all of the possible subtypes. Fortunately, as this study focuses on 
language and how it is used in social contexts, there is at hand a subgroup well-attested in 
high schools: the clique. These arise on the basis of shared affinity and exclusionary 
practices, which clearly divide the students into groups, as will be evident in chapters 6 
and 7.  
2.2 Overview of Literature 
Autism was first studied by Leo Kanner in 1943. Asperger’s Syndrome gets it 
name from Hans Asperger’s work (1944), which was translated into English in 1979 
(Wing 1981). Asperger’s Syndrome was put into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders in 1994 (Bartlett et al. 2005).  
As autism is a neurological condition, much research sought to understand the 
brain differences between neurotypical individuals and those with autism. Initially, most 
autism research was conducted from a clinical psychological perspective, but over time 
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autism has become a staple of interest in linguistic pragmatics study. Thus, autism 
researchers study both the neurological and chemical aspects of the physical brain, as 
well as the metaphysical mind.  
Autism has been a popular testing ground for pragmatics because of the 
comprehension difficulties associated with individuals with autism. This is reflected in 
the title of Baltaxe’s significant study “Pragmatic Deficits in the Language of Autistic 
Adolescents” (1977). Martin and McDonald (2003) give a helpful summary of three 
different hypotheses proposed to account for the deficits: 1) social inference theory, 
which involves Theory of Mind (ToM), 2) weak central coherence, and 3) weak 
executive function. Given the different hypotheses, Happé et al. (2006) stress that, while 
each theory makes a helpful contribution, there is no single explanation for pragmatic 
deficits in autism. Nonetheless, much pragmatics research has focused on the ToM 
account, including Relevance Theory. 
2.2.1 Theory of Mind and Figurative Language 
Theory of Mind refers to the ability to infer the mental states of others, and to use 
these attributed mental states “to predict and explain the behavior of others” (Cummings 
2013). Also referred to as “mind-reading” or “metarepresentation,” ToM is relevant for 
pragmatic studies because it focuses on the role of inferences in communication. 
Inferences are required for everyday conversations and figurative language, both 
considered to be areas with which those with ASD struggle. The Theory of Mind account 
was first associated with autism by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). Loukusa and Moilanen 
review twenty such studies and emphasize that those with ASD have “deficiencies in 
pragmatic comprehension and inference abilities, but not an inability” (2009:900).  
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The first study that connected Relevance Theory and autism was from Happé 
(1993). It compared the comprehension of simile, metaphor and irony among individuals 
with autism and neurotypical individuals. Participants were grouped by their level of 
ToM ability, as determined by false-belief tasks. Those with first-order ability could infer 
what a story character was thinking. Those with second-order ability could infer what a 
story character thought someone else was thinking.  
One of Happé’s conclusions was that first-order ToM ability was required for 
metaphor comprehension. However, in a 2005 replication of the study, Norbury found 
that first-order ToM was not necessary for metaphor comprehension. With a few 
adjustments to Happé’s comprehension task, Norbury found that semantic ability was a 
better predictor of success on the metaphor task (2005). Wearing (2010) summarizes the 
differences and limitations of the studies. She maintains that some ability to infer mental 
states is required for metaphor comprehension, although it need not be first-order ability 
as determined by a false-belief task. 
Happé also found a strong correlation between irony comprehension and the 
ability to pass a second-order false belief task. Thus, more ToM ability is required to 
comprehend irony than metaphor. This correlation was confirmed by others such as 
Kaland et al. (2005), who tested adolescents with Asperger’s Syndrome. Kaland et al. 
also developed the more contextually-demanding Stories from Everyday Life to be a more 
appropriate challenge for adolescents (2002). The tests confirmed that individuals with 
HFA/AS were more successful with inferences about physical states than mental states.  
In the research reported in this thesis, I used materials from Norbury (2005) and 
Kaland et al. (2002). I will later compare the results of my participants to theirs. I will not 
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attempt to settle the unresolved research issues mentioned above, but the tests will be a 
starting point for discussing the linguistic capital of the students.  
2.2.2 Studies of Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders in Context 
Many studies have noted the limitations of written comprehension tasks for 
determining the pragmatic abilities of individuals, whether neurotypical or those with 
ASD. An approach that emphasizes the deficits of a population may not notice their 
abilities. In a review “Autism: Cognitive Deficit or Cognitive Style?” Happé (1999:216) 
comments, 
It is not difficult to find things that people with autism have difficulty with—
indeed, most autistic people also have general learning difficulties and low IQ. 
However, I will argue in this review that progress in understanding this disorder, 
and its implications for normal development, will arise chiefly through 
exploration of what people with autism are good at.  
Though Happé was reviewing literature focused on lower-functioning individuals with 
autism, her point about investigating abilities applies just as well to the HFA and AS 
populations. Therefore, others such as Bartlett et al. have recognized the “potential value 
of investigating real life interactions rather than performance on standardised language 
assessment results” (2005:204).  
Bartlett et al. (2005:204) state that much autism research has been based on the 
“cognitive theories” mentioned above as executive dysfunction, ToM, and weak central 
coherence. They write,  
[These] cognitive theories have attempted to explain certain characteristics of AS 
in terms of the individual’s internal functioning (i.e., how s/he ‘thinks’ or ‘sees 
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the world’). However, social context appears to be crucial in understanding how 
these characteristics manifest themselves in everyday interactions.  
Bartlett et al. explore “potential directions for investigation that may provide a 
broader view of language, for example those based on a sociolinguistic perspective” 
(2005:204). The three potential directions they explore are 1) Conversational Analysis, 2) 
the Children’s Communication Checklist (Bishop & Baird 2001) and 3) an approach 
based on Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (1994). They note the strengths and 
limitations of each option. I will summarize the first two options to provide background 
for my methodology (chapter 3). 
First, though conversational analysis includes the context of interaction between 
speakers, it is often difficult to obtain natural conversational samples. This can be 
especially difficult in a clinical setting or if the participants are not familiar with the 
researcher. The ethnographic study of Ochs et al. (2004) avoided these drawbacks. They 
logged 381 hours of video and audio recordings of 16 children from 8 to 12 years of age 
with HFA and AS. They recorded “everyday interactions with family members at home, 
in transit to and from school, and with peers and teachers at school” (2004:149). The 
study focused on the children’s ability to take perspectives according to measures such as 
conversational turn-taking. 
Second, the strength of a pragmatic checklist is that it makes possible a discussion 
of particular linguistic phenomena of interest, often in a quantifiable way. For example, it 
is possible to count cohesive references in a text and compare patterns among 
participants. The work of de Villiers et al. exemplifies this. They developed a scale for 
measuring conversational impairment based on a Systemic Functional Linguistics 
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paradigm (2007). For their analysis they used 46 semi-structured conversations between a 
researcher and children with HFA between the ages of 10 and 14. Regarding the 
limitation mentioned above, de Villiers et al. (2007:1378) expand:  
The context of a semi-structured conversation, though parallel to a clinical 
interview, is more restricted and artificial than a casual social setting. A less 
formal task might yield different conversational styles. It is, in addition, difficult 
to generalize about children’s “typical” communication using 10-min samples 
with the same adult.  
In another article, de Villiers et al. (2010) give further insight into the 
methodology and limitations of recording and transcribing conversational data for 
assessing pragmatic ability. They have also made helpful distinctions among specific 
pragmatic processes and the comprehension abilities required for each. For example, they 
separate 1) primary pragmatic processes such as slot filling and disambiguation from 2) 
secondary pragmatic processes such as metaphor and conversational implicature and 3) 
secondary pragmatic processes requiring higher-order inferences such as irony 
(2007:313).  
Similarly, Chevallier et al. (2010) confirm that there are “important differences 
between pragmatic phenomena of different sub-types” and “that some aspects of 
pragmatics are spared in at least a subgroup of individuals on the autism spectrum” 
(2010:1114). They call for future work “to carefully characterise this subpopulation, the 
nature of their social deficit, and the scope of the pragmatic processes they can readily 
deal with” (2010:1114). Chevallier et al. (2010:1114) also emphasize the need for more 
naturalistic contexts: 
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Another important issue for future research will be to determine to what extent 
these findings apply in more naturalistic contexts, especially given that some 
authors have demonstrated that individuals with ASD perform differently in 
explicit experimental settings and in more naturalistic situations (Klin et al. 2000). 
In particular, it would be worth exploring whether people with autism 
spontaneously produce scalar inferences in conversational contexts.  
While this study will not explore scalar inferences, it will examine conversational 
uses of a variety of other phenomena employed by this subgroup with pragmatic 
competence, even prowess. 
2.2.3 Summary 
In the past few decades there has been progress in the study of communication in 
autism research. The need remains for exploration of communication among individuals 
in natural, rather than clinical settings. This is particularly true with regard to individuals 
who excel in supposed areas of pragmatic weakness.  
Additionally, further sociolinguistic research may complement the existing 
literature that emphasizes individual pragmatic comprehension abilities. Relevance 
Theory is useful for this task as it integrates the cognitive and social contexts.  
This thesis contributes by discussing linguistic capital in social contexts involving 
students with ASD, something that has not been explored. The context of peers in a 






I recruited as subjects the students with ASD who are in my two high school 
classrooms designated for students with ASD. The students usually spend time in these 
classrooms before and after school, during lunch, and during study hall periods. These 
students with ASD are not marginalized from neurotypical students; they take general 
education classes with neurotypical students throughout the day. The purpose of the 
classrooms designated for students with ASD is not widely known to neurotypical 
students, except for friends of the students with ASD who are invited to hang out in the 
classrooms. 
First, parents were contacted and informed of the study. Interested parents and 
students signed the consent and assent forms. I also obtained consent forms from faculty 
who work with the students and share the room at lunchtime. As a faculty member, I was 
also present—as a participant—in the classroom at lunchtime. Students and faculty 
remained participants during the months of May and June 2014. 
3.1.2 Age and IQ Scores 
Student information such as age and IQ scores were accessed in the individual 
educational plans (IEPs) of student participants for whom I had parental consent and 
13 
student assent. The 14 student participants ranged from to approximately 15 to 19 years 
old.  
 The IQ scores available for different students ranged according to the date they 
were last assessed and the particular test used.2 Nevertheless, among the 14 students 
filmed, Verbal Comprehension IQ scores ranged from 71 to 126.  
3.2 Data Collection 
This study is based on both quantitative and qualitative data.  
The quantitative data collection included a metaphor comprehension test and a 
story comprehension test. Each test came with a built-in scoring key. The test question 
portions were conducted in unoccupied classrooms or conference rooms as private testing 
areas. 
The qualitative data consists of lunchtime audio-visual recordings. These 
provided naturally-occurring conversations. I recorded the audio and visual data with the 
built-in camera on my laptop computer.  
3.2.1 Metaphor Test 
I used the comprehension test from Norbury (2005), based on that of Happé 
(1993). It evaluates the comprehension abilities of students concerning synonym, simile, 
and metaphor. It consisted of 18 questions, with six from each category. A sentence 
                                                 
 
2 Including: WISC-IV, WISC-III, WASI, WIAT-2, WIAT-III, Stanford Binet-V, Stanford Binet-IV, Leiter 
International Performance Scale-Revised 
14 
stimulus was given, followed by the correct option mixed in with three foil choices. The 
list of all questions is in appendix A.  
3.2.2 Story Test 
 I used the Stories from Everyday Life comprehension test from Kaland et al. 
(2002). It was applied to evaluate students’ ability to make inferences about physical 
states of objects and mental states of characters in a short story. For example, to test the 
ability to make an inference about a physical state or event, one question asks why a 
woman in the story withdrew money from the bank. The story mentions that her washing 
machine broke down and that she has to buy a new one soon. The hearer must infer she 
withdrew money from the bank to purchase a new washing machine. In the same story, to 
test the ability to make an inference about a mental state, one question asks why the 
woman tells the robbers that her wallet is in her coat pocket, where it really is, rather than 
lying to them and telling them it is in her purse. The hearer must infer that she assumes 
the robbers will think she is lying, and therefore she performs the double-bluff. 
 The mental inferences thus demonstrate theory of mind capability, which is 
significant for pragmatic language comprehension and use. Though 26 stories were 
available in the full test, I chose only four, which I applied to each student. This allowed 
for a small evaluation of the ability to make mental inferences, though it did not allow for 
a full comparison with results obtained by Kaland and others, who applied the full 26 
story version (Kaland et al. 2002, 2005, 2008).  
I modified some of the vocabulary and phrasing of Kaland’s stories to make them 




There are two classrooms where the students with ASD usually eat lunch. Only 
one was used for recording lunch conversations, while the other was an area for non-
participants. A ‘Filming in Progress’ sign was placed on the door of the room where 
filming took place, and I verbally reminded non-participants that they could instead use 
the room across the hall. I also sent a letter to parents of non-participants warning of 
when I would be filming, reassuring them that non-participants would be able to be in the 
room across the hall, out of camera range.  
Video recordings were taken over the course of four weeks in May and June 
2014. Lunches in the classroom were recorded 16 times. Most sessions were 
approximately one hour, although some were approximately 30 minutes. My laptop 
computer was set in the corner of the room, where I recorded through the built-in camera 
on the computer. A blank piece of paper was set over the computer screen so as to cover 
the image of what was being recorded, to not further distract students. Students were 
aware of filming and on a handful of occasions would speak to the camera or make 
mention of the recordings. Overall, the presence of the camera did not greatly alter the 
typical fare of lunchtime conversations in the classroom. 
Originally, part of the aim of filming during lunch was to observe the frequency 
of uses of simile, metaphor and irony by both students and faculty. It was assumed that 
irony, requiring a richer theory of mind than metaphor and simile, would be more 
difficult for individuals with a ToM deficit. Thus, one goal was to compare student 
performance on the individual testing with performance in naturally-occurring 
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conversations at lunch. Additionally, I wanted to compare the frequency of use of 
different forms of figurative language among teachers compared with students.  
 However, the frequency count approach fell short for a few reasons. First, at 
lunch time, the humble audio and visual recording capabilities of my computer were not 
adequate for to cover the variety of overlapping conversations happening in different 
parts of the classroom. This made transcription difficult, and I was not able to do reliable 
frequency counts of metaphors. Second, from what could be determined from the 
recordings, similes and metaphors were used quite sparingly. It was difficult to compare 
their use among students and groups, as students and teachers did not consistently eat in 
the classroom at the same time from day to day. 
Fortunately, there was a consistent wealth of other relevant linguistic and social 
phenomena. These were more interesting, especially because they have received little 





An overview of Relevance Theory will help to frame the discussion of simile, 
metaphor, irony and other forms of communication used in the tests and recordings.  
4.1 Basics of Relevance Theory 
Relevance Theory is a theory of communication that emphasizes the role of 
inferences in communication. This is in contrast to the traditional code model of 
communication. According to the code model, the meaning a speaker wants to 
communicate is simply encoded into a linguistic form, which, when uttered and received 
by the hearer, is then decoded to receive the meaning of the speaker. But this model does 
not adequately represent what occurs in communication. It is not a simple input-output 
system where hearers receive 100% of the meaning from an utterance every time. 
Meaning is often lost, inferred, expanded, etc. There is much more to communication 
than simply encoding, transmission, and decoding. 
Rather than inputs, Relevance theory speaks of ostensive stimuli. Stimuli such as 
utterances or gestures are OSTENSIVE when they communicate that they are intended to 
inform the hearer. Relevance Theory sees communication as the giving of evidence of an 
intention, to be inferred from the linguistic meaning of the utterance and the context. The 
inferential process is guided by relevance, as defined below (Wilson and Sperber 
2012:38):
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Relevance is defined as a property of inputs to cognitive processes. The 
processing of an input (e.g., an utterance) may yield some cognitive effects (e.g.,  
revisions of beliefs). Everything else being equal, the greater the effects, the 
greater the relevance of the input. The processing of the input (and the derivation 
of these effects) involves some mental effort. Everything else being equal the 
greater the effort, the lower the relevance.  
As ostensive stimuli are processed they produce COGNITIVE EFFECTS, which are 
the revisions of thoughts or beliefs provoked by the ostensive stimuli and context. These 
cognitive effects may bring new information to the hearer. Alternatively, they may 
strengthen, weaken, or eliminate existing assumptions.  
To illustrate, imagine a man and a woman standing in a bar at a distance from 
each other. The woman is staring in the direction of the man, and he interprets her gaze as 
an ostensive stimuli. This brings cognitive effects of new information to the man that she 
might be interested in him. She applies lipstick and walks towards the man. This 
strengthens his assumption that she is interested in him. However, these assumptions are 
weakened as she walks past the man, and then finally eliminated as she kisses her 
husband, who has just arrived at the bar. That is how cognitive effects work.  
The centrality of relevance is evident in the two principles of relevance (Wilson 
and Sperber 2012:6). 
Cognitive Principle of Relevance 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. 
Communicative Principle of Relevance 
Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of it’s own optimal relevance. 
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Wilson and Sperber note that “these principles are descriptive rather than 
normative”; this allows general predications about communication, as well as exceptions 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012:6).  
Not all acts of communication are fully ostensive, or overt. For example, a 
speaker may choose for her utterance to be less than fully relevant to the hearer or over-
hearers, such as in manipulation, deception, and inside-jokes. Kevin Sparks calls this 
scalar ostension, the concept that “a speaker could be more or less obvious as to how 
much she intends her stimulus to be relevant to a particular audience” (Sparks 2012:32). 
This is particularly the case when there are multiple audiences, such as during a court 
hearing where the interlocutor is but one audience, while all of those watching the 
hearing are a second audience. In this thesis, scalar ostension across multiple audiences 
occurs when student A wants to tell a joke to student B about student C, all while within 
earshot of student C and the teacher, with varied ostension toward each hearer or over-
hearer. 
Since communication involves risk, there is a subconscious, instantaneous 
calculation of cost that speakers and hearers undergo when speaking and listening. The 
speaker calculates how to craft his utterance so that it will achieve the expected benefit in 
his hearer. The hearer interprets the utterance based on how much effort is required. This 
calculation of cost occurs in all communicative activity as the: 
Presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995:266-78): 
(a) The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing 
(b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities 
and preferences.  
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The presumption of optimal relevance is always at play for both the speaker and hearer. 
The hearer processes the utterance with the:  
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure: 
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. In particular, test 
interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) 
in order of accessibility. 
(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. (Wilson and Sperber 
2012:276). 
This comprehension procedure is consistent for all types of ostensive 
communication, whether speaking, signing, or reading, and applies to both explicit and 
implicit meaning, as discussed below.  
4.2 Explicatures and Implicatures 
Relevance Theory distinguishes what is made explicit by an utterance and what is 
implied or implicated. Sperber and Wilson use the terms explicatures and implicature. An 
EXPLICATURE is “a proposition communicated by an utterance… if and only if it is a 
development of a logical form encoded by the utterance” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:182). 
An IMPLICATURE is “a proposition communicated by an utterance but not explicitly” 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:182). The following example illustrates the difference between 
explicatures and implicatures.  
 (a) John: Do you want to go out tonight? How about Addison’s?  
(b) Scott: Possibly. Keep in mind I’ve got these old man ears. 
(c) John: As in you don’t want to go somewhere loud? 
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An explicature of Scott’s uttering, “Possibly” is that he possibly wants to go out 
with his friend on the night of the utterance. It is the fully-propositional form of the 
utterance, enriched by fleshing out the ellipsis. The hearer thus decodes and infers to 
complete the explicature. 
An implicature of Scott’s utterance, “Keep in mind I’ve got these old man ears” is 
that Scott has bad hearing. This results by inferring the contextual information that old 
men are likely to have bad hearing. The additional contextual information that Addison’s 
is a loud establishment allows further implicatures, such as that Scott hesitates to go to 
Addison’s because he would not be able hear his friend well, dialogue would be difficult, 
and they might enjoy the evening more in a quieter establishment. None of these 
implicatures are explicitly stated, but rather they are implied by the combination of 
utterances’ explicature(s) and contextual information. 
Both explicatures and implicatures may be STRONG or WEAK. The strength of an 
explicature depends on its degree of explicitness. The alternate response “I would 
possibly like to go with you tonight to Addison’s” is more explicit, hence stronger, than 
“Possibly.” The utterance is closer to the explicit content of the speaker’s meaning, and 
therefore the explicature is stronger. The stronger the explicature, the less responsibility 
the hearer has for inferring the speaker’s intended meaning.  
The strength or weakness of an implicature also depends on the degree of 
indeterminacy of an utterance (Wilson and Sperber 2012:17). The hearer must make 
inferences about the speaker’s implicated premises and propositions from the utterance 
and the context. There is some risk involved in supplying these premises, but the speaker 
intends for the hearer to do so. The principle of relevance applies here as the speaker 
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assumes that his utterance, though indeterminate, is sufficient for the hearer to 
comprehend, given the right context and range of possible implicatures and propositions 
of which it is composed. 
In Scott’s utterance, some possible implicated premises (a-c) and conclusions (d-
f) are that: 
(a) Addison’s is a loud establishment. 
(b) Scott has bad hearing like old men do. 
(c) People with bad hearing do not like noisy restaurants. 
(d) Scott hesitates to go to Addison’s because he will not be able hear his friend 
well 
 
(e) Dialogue will be difficult. 
(f) They might have a more enjoyable time in a quieter establishment. 
John’s inferred conclusion(s) will depend on which implied premises he selects. 
John grasped Scott’s intended meaning of hesitating to go somewhere loud on account of 
his hearing. Since many of the implicatures are similar, it might not make that much 
difference in their communication if John were to choose one rather than another. Sperber 
and Wilson summarize, “The greater the range of alternatives, the weaker the 
implicatures, and the more responsibility the hearer has to take for the particular choices 
he makes” (Wilson and Sperber 2012:16).  
The notion that inferences are always being made in communication might leave 
the impression that there is too much freedom for unrestrained, misguided inferences. Yet 
the principle of relevance accounts for how interlocutors can regularly understand each 
other. Even when explicatures and implicatures are weak, communication is efficient. 
Furthermore, as humans like to minimize the amount of processing effort and maximize 
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the cognitive effects, it is not surprising that we do not speak explicitly all the time. 
Consider the processing effort required by a more explicit response: 
(a) “I am possibly interested in going with you, John, to Addison’s tonight, but I have bad 
hearing similar to that of an old man and I fear that I would not be able to hear you in the 
noisy restaurant and our experience would not be enjoyable.”  
The processing effort required to handle such an explicit response is even more 
costly than inferring many parts in from a less encoded version. It should not surprise us 
then, that weak communication is ubiquitous. While explicit communication plays an 
important role, weak communication makes possible a wide range of effects that go 
beyond explicit communication. This applies to everyday conversation as well as to 
metaphor, to which we now turn. 
4.3 Loose and Literal Language 
Another way communication may be more or less explicit has to do with 
broadening and narrowing of lexical entries. Just as determining the meaning of an 
utterance requires decoding and inference, so it is with lexical units as small as words. To 
illustrate, 
(1) John: Do you want to go out tonight?  
(2) Scott: I’ve got these old man ears. 
(3a) Aaron: Aerial silks is the sexiest sport in the world… 
(3b) Aaron: …and I manage to make it look like a shaved grizzly bear falling 
down a mountain. 
 
In these examples, words are used in a way that broadens or narrows the meaning 
from their lexically encoded sense. In (1), if the typical lexically encoded meaning of to 
go out means simply to leave one’s house, it is here narrowed to give the sense of going 
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somewhere, especially to a bar, out with friends. In (2), Scott does not strictly claim to 
have old man ears. Instead, the lexical entry old man ears is broadened from its meaning 
of the ears of an elderly person to being hard of hearing. In (3a), the sport is probably not 
sexually attractive, but rather sexy in the broadened sense of exciting or appealing in 
some other way. In (3b), Aaron does not look exactly like a shaved grizzly bear falling 
down a mountain while performing aerial silks, but perhaps in a loose sense he lacks the 
strong majesty that befits such a creature or sport.  
These examples depict a range of phenomena (synonyms, metaphor, informal use, 
hyperbole and simile), but the interpretative procedure is the same. In each, the hearer 
must use context and make inferences as to the speaker’s intended meaning. Contrary to 
classical notions of a divide between literal and figurative language, there is not a special 
interpretive procedure for metaphor or any other phenomena. Different linguistic theories 
label uses as literal, figurative, loose, approximate, or metaphorical. Wilson and Sperber 
state that “these notions may denote regions on a continuum rather than sharply distinct 
categories” (2012:23).   
Relevance Theory’s unified account for these loose uses of language employs ad 
hoc concepts.3 During the comprehension of an utterance, the hearer comprehension 
                                                 
 
3 There is a development in Relevance Theory’s account of metaphor. The earlier account explained 




process is mutually adjusting the possible explicatures and implicatures until the hearer’s 
expectations of relevance are satisfied (Wilson and Sperber 2012:21). The concepts are 
constructed for the particular utterance, and hence are labeled ad hoc. In (1) above, the 
hearer’s response to John will hinge on the concept he constructs for GO OUT*, that is 
whether he takes it to mean hanging out with friends at a bar or going on a romantic date. 
Inferring the meaning of (1) might be easier than (3b), because the simile in (3b) 
“consists of an ad hoc concept that is characterised by its inferential role and not by a 
definition, and moreover this inferential role is left to the hearer to elaborate” (Wilson 
and Sperber 2012:22). Still, even with imaginative similes or metaphors, ad hoc concepts 
are constructed for comprehension just like any other utterance. In the case of (3b), the ad 
hoc concept SHAVED GRIZZLY BEAR FALLING DOWN A MOUNTAIN* would weakly imply 
that which lacks its befitting majesty, is deprived of its masculinity, etc. Its relevance 
comes from the combination of the implicatures of the ad hoc concept with the contextual 
information about Aaron and the sport (Wilson and Sperber 2012:121). Thus, like the 
shaved grizzly bear Aaron is deprived of his masculinity in some way. 
4.4 Standardization, Creativity and Conventionality 
Though ad hoc concepts are constructed nearly instantaneously for each 
utterance, after repeated use by an individual or group of individuals, such broadened 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
way, both implicatures and ad hoc concepts will figure in the variety of linguistic phenomena appearing in 
this thesis (See Clark 2013:266ff). 
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senses may become standardized, and lexicalized. The role of conventionalization applies 
to mundane uses like (a) above as well as to metaphors.  
Metaphors may be more or less creative. Even an initially creative metaphor may 
over time become conventionalized. The broadened sense becomes lexicalized, at which 
point lexical lookup is less costly than inferential processing to derive relevant cognitive 
effects. Vega Moreno (2007:112) puts creativity and conventionality on a spectrum, as 
given below.  
We may assume that loosely used expressions (e.g. metaphorical expressions) 
range from the very creative to the rather conventional or standardised. At one 
end of the spectrum of creativity we can place the poetic metaphors of great poets. 
At the other end, we may place a number of dead (or nearly dead) metaphors 
which have arguably developed an extra sense in the language (‘the leg of the 
table’, ‘the foot of the mountain’, ‘a syntactic tree’, etc.).  
Conventional metaphors are useful for everyday communication. Vega Moreno 
writes, “Formulaic expressions arise naturally in every language and in every culture, 
showing the tendency of language users to store ready-made expressions and use them to 
communicate” (2007:219). Standardized forms communicate simple ideas to get a point 
across quickly. Still, there is a value to the creative uses that suggest an array of weak 
implicatures. They may convey complex ideas and allow the hearer more freedom in 
personalizing the relevant implicatures. Yet, the hearer’s interpretation is not left to 
completely arbitrary associations, because the inferential process is guided by the  
“subtlety and directionality of weak implicatures” (Wilson and Sperber 2012:120). 
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Pilkington has labeled the cognitive effects produced as a wide array of weak 
implicatures as poetic effects (Wilson and Sperber 2012:118; Pilkington 2000). Wilson 
and Sperber note that  “Although metaphors are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
creation of genuine poetic effects, they are particularly well suited to this purpose, for 
several reasons” (Wilson and Sperber 2012:119). Among these reasons are the following: 
1) The ad hoc concepts from some metaphors can involve broadening and narrowing at 
the same time. 2) The relevance of the metaphor depends on the weak implicatures and 
the hearer’s freedom to infer them. 3) Multiple readings of or extended reflection on the 
metaphor may prompt a wider array of implications that make the metaphor more 
enjoyable (Wilson and Sperber 2012:122).  
Wilson and Sperber emphasize that metaphor is not unique in allowing for poetic 
effects, nor does it require its own theory, but that, “on the whole, the closer one gets to 
the metaphor end of the literal-loose-metaphorical continuum, the greater the freedom of 
interpretation left to hearers or readers, and the more likely it is that relevance will be 
achieved through a wide array of weak implicatures, i.e. through poetic effects” (Wilson 
and Sperber 2012:122). This thesis will build on the notion that there are a range of 
linguistic phenomena in addition to metaphor that make use of poetic effects. 
Additionally, I will argue that skill in creating and deriving poetic effects can be a mark 
of prestige, particularly in an environment where not everyone is able to do so.  
4.5 Wharton’s Showing-MeaningNN Continuum 
Among the ways inferential communication may be stronger or weaker, Tim 
Wharton has emphasized the non-verbal varieties of ostension. This accounts for the 
ways that gesture, tone of voice, prosody, and facial expressions make communication 
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stronger or weaker. Such behaviors “affect the outcome of the interpretive process, 
guiding the hearer to a certain range or type of conclusions” (Wharton 2013:251). 
Wharton places non-verbal communication and linguistic utterances on opposite ends of 
the showing-meaningNN continuum
4. Showing behaviors are considered natural, while 
linguistic utterances are considered non-natural meaning (meaningNN). For example, a 
teenager rolling his eyes while saying “whatever” is using both showing and meaningNN 
to contribute to the meaning of his utterance. For more complicated combinations, “the 
continuum provides a theoretical tool which allows us to conceptualize more clearly the 
observation… that ostensive stimuli are often highly complex composites of different, 
inter-related behaviours which fall at different points between ‘showing’ and 
‘meaningNN’” (Wharton 2013:252).  
The continuum also allows us to see how, over time, some things from showing 
end of the continuum may shift towards the meaningNN end, becoming more linguistically 
productive. An example is the interjection “yugh” over time becoming the adjective 
family “yucky,” “yuckier” and “yuckiest” (Wharton 2013:252).  
Wharton’s continuum is relevant for this thesis as there are times when the 
creativity exhibited by a speaker or required by a hearer involves prosody, tone, gesture, 
facial expressions, and so forth. These ostensive stimuli contribute to the implicatures and 
explicatures required in irony and parody. 
                                                 
 
4 Wharton’s continuum is drawn from Grice’s article “Meaning” (1957). 
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CHAPTER 5 
QUANTITATIVE TEST RESULTS 
The two comprehension tests used in this study were designed to provide 
quantitative data. The test recordings, however, also evidenced the students’ thinking 
processes as well as their abilities with a variety of pragmatic phenomena. This chapter 
will give the test results and follow with a sampling of the various comments made 
during the tests that evidence pragmatic abilities. Thus, my focus is not the quantitative 
results themselves, but the patterns and limitations that emerged during testing. These 
patterns and limitations prepare the way for the discussion in chapters 6 and 7. 
5.1 Metaphor Test Results 
5.1.1 Patterns 
The metaphor test revealed a few patterns. Among the 13 students tested, the 
success rate for metaphor comprehension questions was slightly lower than for synonym 
and simile. The table below shows this.  
Table 1. Metaphor Test Results 
Item Answers Correct Total Questions Percentage 
Synonym 73 78 93.5% 
Simile 66 78 84.6% 
Metaphor 63 78 80.8%   
 
Admittedly, I used a sample of only thirteen participants and did not have a neurotypical 
control group. For comparison, Norbury (2005) had groups of 30 students, 
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between 8 and 15 years old. By contrast, the 13 students tested in this study were between 
the ages of 15 and 19. The original study by Happé (1993) included approximately 18   
individuals with autism ranging from age 10 to 28. However, as noted before, I used 
Norbury’s modified version of Happé’s test materials, so they are not entirely 
comparable. At the very least, the present numbers give an indication of the competencies 
of the participants, from which to compare their use of other figurative language in the 
story tasks and lunchtime conversations.  
Some individual questions posed problems for participants. This may have been 
due to the novelty of the simile or metaphor. For example, of 13 students, six failed to 
correctly identify the simile “Pat has very long and smooth hair. It is (a) like spaghetti, 
(b) fuzzy,  (c) like a brush, (d) like macaroni.” Three students opted for ‘fuzzy,’ and three 
students opted for ‘like a brush.’ Meanwhile, no student failed the question “Our new 
school is very big and I always get lost. It is (a) a maze, (b) a map, (c) a string, (d) a 
web.” It is understandable that students had more success with conventionalized 
metaphors than creative ones. As quoted in the last chapter and here repeated, Vega 
Moreno explains: 
We may assume that loosely used expressions (e.g. metaphorical expressions) 
range from the very creative to the rather conventional or standardised. At one 
end of the spectrum of creativity we can place the poetic metaphors of great poets. 
At the other end, we may place a number of dead (or nearly dead) metaphors 
which have arguably developed an extra sense in the language (‘the leg of the 
table’, ‘the foot of the mountain’, ‘a syntactic tree’, etc.) (2007:112).  
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Further, the fact that the most missed question was a simile rather than a metaphor 
cautions against a hasty generalization that metaphors are always more difficult than 
similes.5 
5.1.2 Limitations 
Compared to the tests done by Happé (1993) and Norbury (2005), I had fewer 
students, I did not have a control group, and I did not use as many different copies of the 
test. The test appears to be better suited for younger or lower functioning individuals with 
autism, as many of the simile and metaphor choices are simple or conventionalized.  
As mentioned above, some metaphors were quite conventionalized, so although 
they were metaphors in one sense, they did not really test the ability of students to infer 
weak implicatures, which is understood to be what makes it difficult for many with 
autism to interpret metaphors.  
Again, metaphors presented in isolation may not be the best means for assessing 
subjects’ metaphor comprehension. The Norbury test does provide some 
contextualization for the metaphor questions. For example, each included an initial 
sentence to give some context, such as “Our new school is very big and I always get 
lost.” However, even with this added contextual element, the test questions are still 
                                                 
 
5 Wearing (2012:212) writes, “One might expect, however, that similes involving less 
straightforwardly literal comparisons (e.g. ‘His voice was as cold as the Arctic snows’: Wilson and 
Carston, 2006, p. 427) would be as problematic as their corresponding metaphors—this is another matter 
that stands in need of empirical investigation”.  
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formulaic, especially when presented in succession in a testing situation. In everyday 
conversation there are many other contextual factors that constrain the interpretation of a 
metaphor, and much of this is missing in a stripped down task. For this reason, the 
lunchtime recordings help to complement the metaphor task.  
5.2 Story Test Results 
5.2.1 Patterns 
Kaland’s Stories from Everyday Life includes 26 story tests. However, I chose 
four stories and read the same four to each participant. I used the stories to test the 
comprehension of double bluff, irony, lack of consideration for others’ feelings, and 
mistaken intentions. This small selection was due to time limitations and sometimes 
because of the limited attention span of participants. Nevertheless, I found some patterns 
that are similar to those of Kaland (2002, 2005, 2008). He tested 21 individuals in the 
Asperger group from ages 10 to 20 (approximately), while I tested 13 students between 
the ages of 15 and 19.  
The participants in this study answered almost all physical inference6 questions 
correctly. Kaland also reported better scores on the physical inference test among 
individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome. The table below shows success rates for physical 
and mental inferences in the students I tested.  
 
                                                 
 
6 For examples, see section 3.2.2. 
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Table 2. Story Test Inference Results 












50 2 0 52 96.2% 
Mental  
Inference 
12 and 5 8 11 and 16 52 32.7% 
 
Overall, participants did not score high on mental inferences. Some students, of 
course, scored higher than others on all test items. The scoring methodology is based on a 
0-2 scale: 0=incorrect, 1=partially-correct, and 2=fully correct. Fully correct responses 
require students to form a conceptualization of a character’s mental state and make use of 
propositions therein. As this is a is a partially subjective evaluation for raters to make, 
two raters evaluated each response for the sake of inter-rater reliability. In the case of a 
disagreement, the mean was taken. As is evident from the chart, the co-raters disagreed 
on 21 of 52 questions.7 One possible influence on this outcome was that I  
The small sample size—only four stories per person—and the discrepancies of the 
co-raters make the mental inference results suggestive but unreliable. Nevertheless, the 
story tests proved to be fertile ground for listening to reasoning of students, as well as 
their own demonstrations of pragmatic ability and frequent humor. This will be 
demonstrated below.  
                                                 
 




Admittedly, the results given for mental inference are not sufficiently reliable to 
support solid conclusions. Fortunately, the goals of this thesis do not hinge on the results 
of my abbreviated application of the story comprehension test. In this section I will 
describe a few other limitations I confronted in the story testing procedure.  
As discussed in the literature review, chapter 2, ratable comprehension tasks have 
their limitations. First, repeated testing revealed that the story tests are limited compared 
to natural conversations. Just as the metaphor task is a stripped down form of the way 
people naturally use metaphor or loose language in everyday speech, so too these stories 
are only imitations of real life situations and the inferences that a hearer would need to 
make to comprehend them. Even though I modified the vocabulary and stories from the 
Norwegian/British English to American English, they are still scripted stories rather than 
natural conversations.  
Second, though the scripted stories are impoverished in this way, the readers had 
some freedom in how they read the story. To be consistent, I read each story out loud 
even though students could have read them on their own.8 Still, it is impossible to assure 
that I read each story with the same tone of voice, facial expressions, and prosody for 
                                                 
 
8 In fact, one student requested a few times to read them on his own, saying that he could read them in 
a more dramatic voice. I let him re-read them at the end.   
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each participant. This possible lack of consistency in reading is sensed most acutely when 
these same behaviors play into the students’ comprehension of a text. 
To illustrate, consider the importance of prosody. In the story testing irony 
comprehension, Adrian says of his messy brother “Mother, Tom has as usual done a 
splendid job tidying up.” When I read this ironic punch line, I used neither an obvious 
deadpan tone, nor the overly enthusiastic tone associated with parodic irony.9 I could 
have delivered the punch line in a much lower pitch or louder volume, to more obviously 
signal the irony. Because I chose a mildly lower pitch, comprehension results for irony 
were divided. A few students described Adrian as being, “sarcastic,” “ironic” or 
“facetious.” Others assumed that Adrian was lying to his mom or covering for his 
brother, for fear that their mom would discipline him if he had not cleaned his room. 
Some students suggested both, that it could have been either lying or irony. Thus, 
prosody makes a difference, but the written test in itself did not constrain what type of 
prosody should be used.  
Fortunately, this weakness of the testing procedure sheds light on the ambiguity 
that may characterize an ironic utterance. Prosody may make an utterance more or less 
obviously ironic.  In everyday life, a speaker chooses how blatant he wants to make his 
                                                 
 
9 Chapter 6 will discuss the difference between the traditional deadpan tone of voice often used in 
irony and the overly enthusiastic tone of voice that is used in parodic irony. (See also Wilson 2013:45-46, 
47-48, 51) 
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ironic statement. His choice is also influenced by the desire to preserve effort. He may 
opt for a mildly lower pitch rather than a greatly lower pitch simply because it requires 
less physical effort. Whatever the motivation of speaker prosody, in the testing situation, 
weaker prosodic signals may more closely replicate everyday speech and better test 
inference abilities.  
A third limitation of the story test is when the test question assumes one 
background context that is not most relevant to the participants. For example, one 
question tests the comprehension of mistaken intentions. Tina asks Charlotte, “Can you 
carry my bag?” Charlotte says, “Yes, I can,” but does not do so, presumably because Tina 
did not phrase the question, “Will you carry my bag?” To test the inference of mistaken 
intentions, this question assumes that participants are familiar with individuals who 
misunderstand the difference between “can you” and “will you.”  
However, the most relevant contextual background for the participants may more likely 
be individuals who stubbornly avoid responding to “can you” requests even though they 
understand them as “will you”. One participant mentioned that this was his experience 
with multiple teachers. When he asked, “Can I go to the bathroom,” the teacher would 
respond, “I don’t know, can you?” It is likely that other participants also had this 
experience. However, the story did preempt this mistaken line of reasoning by including 
the description, “Charlotte is a kind and helpful friend, especially when she understands 
that somebody needs her help. But, she doesn’t say so much.” Still, although the stories 
are designed to test one thing, they may evoke a different, more relevant background in 
the hearer, which makes them appear to fail to understand the tested phenomenon 
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A fourth limitation of this testing procedure was my familiarity with the 
participants. I was more familiar with the students with whom I typically work than with 
the others. This may have affected the freedoms certain students felt to give more joking 
answers rather than explicitly focusing on the question. One student joked about the 
character, Charlotte, saying, “She’s being a little snot.” It is difficult to tell if he truly 
thought she was being stubborn rather than misunderstanding a friend’s request, or if he 
said it in keeping with our tendency to make each other laugh. That familiarity with 
participants could influence their range of freedom in responding further reflects the role 
of social motivation for utterances, even during comprehension tasks.   
5.3 Use of Figurative Language in Reponses 
The comments of students during testing can be just as enlightening as their actual 
responses to test items. The students made a few noteworthy uses of figurative language 
both in their responses and during the testing. I will list some here following the pattern 
of MacKay and Shaw (2004). They studied figurative language in students with ASD 
from about 8 to 11 years of age from the perspective of speech act theory. They included 
qualitative data from the participants such as idiosyncratic responses, 
metacommunicative expressions and the use of figurative language. I will follow their 
precedent and include some examples below.  
One student, while not making the correct mental inference to recognize mistaken 
intentions in a story, used a very creative simile, reproduced below. 
(1) Researcher: So then, if she likes to help people, how come she doesn’t help 
Tina here?  
 
Student: How am I supposed to know? I’m not Charlotte, now, am I? 
R: [laugh] So are you saying that she’s lazy, or something else? 
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S: She’s just a dick to her friends. 
R: [laugh] Yeah, but she’s kind and helpful. 
S: I said ‘to friends.’ 
R: Oh. All right 
S: It doesn’t mean she can’t be helpful to complete strangers 
R: I see… 
S: She’s most likely as much of a dick to friends as Clark Kent is a dick to   dogs 
whenever he throws a tennis ball 
R: How does he throw it? I don’t remember. 
S: Superman.  
R: [laugh] 
S: He’s Superman so whenever he throws a ball even its lightest, it won’t go all 
the way across the world. 
 
In this example the student offers an unsolicited creative simile (“as Clark Kent is…”). It 
is impossible to know whether he had heard this simile previously or whether he came up 
with it himself. This student only missed one of the six simile test questions. At the very 
least, this example shows the student’s ability to use a creative simile to make his point 
humorously, even if he struggled to see that the character in the story mistook the 
intentions of her friend.  
 Concerning the same story, another student gave a witty response using ellipsis, 
reproduced below. 
(2) Researcher: And then, how come, why doesn’t Charlotte stop to take Tina’s 
bag? Student: It’s that she could hold it but she never said she would. 
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R: Ok. This is kind of weird, right? Charlotte’s supposed to be kind and helpful, 
so why would she do such a thing? 
S: ‘cause she, ‘cause the question was not worded the way she might understand 
it. 
R: All right.  
S: She really should have been stating the fact that she could hold it, but she was 
not asked if she would hold it. 
R: Do you know anybody that does something like that? 
S: I occasionally do [changed facial expression] 
R: Oh really? Really, like what do you mean? 
S:  Well… I could tell you… 
 
R: [laugh] 
When the student says “Well… I could tell you…” he communicates that he does not 
want to continue the discussion. He emphasizes the word “could” to allude to their 
relevant discussion of the difference between “could” and “would.” He uses ellipses of 
the implied “but I won’t” following “I could tell you.” He thus gives weak implicatures 
and allows the researcher to infer that it is time to end the discussion. This is supported 
by the contextual information manifest to both the researcher and student: they had 
reached the last comprehension question at the end of the tedious metaphor and story 
tests, and therefore could stop at any time.  
 Another student used a variety of interpretive uses of language to convey the 
attitude that he felt the stories and questions were too easy and a waste of his time. After 
quickly completing the metaphor test, he said sarcastically, “That was thoroughly 
baffling.” After the ending of the first story, in which a lady is robbed, he responded in a 
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deadpan ironic tone “Tragedy.” While turning to the second story in the packet, with a 
smile he asked, “Did you write these masterpieces, Mr. B?” implying that they are not 
finely crafted works of literature, but contrived stories for a research purpose. Hoping to 
keep him interested for the third story, I introduced it with, “It’s gonna be ‘The Wrong 
Orange Juice.’ Everybody’s worst nightmare.” He responded, “I’m already excited.” 
After one story, he ironically stated “What a conundrum” to a problem that was minimal. 
After the last story, the student joked with understatement, reproduced below.  
 (3) Researcher: Well, that’s all I have for you. Unless you saw another story you 
wanna do. We can just, we can just dive right in.  
Student: [smiles, grabs left arm] I’ve somehow got work to do that’s even more 
important than this. 
 
All of the examples from this student count as echoic use, uttered with dissociative 
attitudes towards the thoughts they embed. The student distances himself from the 
representation in his utterance, that the tests are difficult or entertaining. Some are more 
typically sarcastic than others. When he says, “That was thoroughly baffling” it is with a 
more annoyed tone than “I’m already excited.” As will be later explored in further depth, 
irony tends to be playful, while sarcasm is aggressive (Muszynska 2012:240). 
Some considerations of politeness influence this student’s language choices. Since 
he was working with a teacher he respected and for whom he had volunteered to help 
with the study, he chose not use language that was blatantly sarcastic or hurtful. Instead, 
irony was the appropriate form to use to assert his intelligence, indicate that the questions 
were below him, while at the same time maintaining social proximity with the researcher. 
To have spoken blatantly sarcastically to the researcher would have been much less 
polite.  
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Other students were less concerned about offending the researcher, or at least had 
differing notions of what was polite or not. To give some idea of the breadth of the 
spectrum of politeness among student respondents, consider the example from another 
student at the very start of the tests. 
(4) [Student sitting with arms folded] 
Researcher: Ok, so do you want to do the stories first or the ‘Finish the Sentence’? 
S: I don’t care. [monotone, disinterested] 
R: Let’s do the ‘Finish the Sentence.’ Ok, now you might think these are boring, 
but you just tell me what— 




This could be categorized as banter, where the aim is to use “seemingly impolite 
utterances in order to mark emotional closeness and solidarity between the interlocutors” 
(Nowik-Dziewicka 2012:245).  
Another student took a different approach expressing his boredom in pretense, 
although the pretense was a reflection of some of his true attitude.  
 (5) Researcher : Ok, next story is called ‘Tidying the Room’ [hands paper to 
student] 
 
Student: [grabs paper, frowns angrily and pretends to throw the paper against his 
arm, then onto the ground. Picks up paper.]  
R: Here’s how it goes 
 
S: I hate this! [slaps paper with hand and makes playful upset noises] 
 
This blunt response, though tempered by his pretense of joking, is different from the 
banter and sarcasm from the two previously mentioned students. To express dislike for 
the exercise, some students made an effort to use the implicatures of weaker 
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communication, while others were more direct. One possible reason for this difference in 
responses is the differing motivations of students to maintain the relationship with the 
researcher. Another possible reason is the differing motivations to prove oneself to be 
smarter than the target audience for the tests or not. Thus, the second two students were 
less concerned with appearing more intelligent than the intended test-audience, and less 
concerned with showing respect towards the researcher.  
These responses help to demonstrate the variety of student participants involved 
as well as the variety of mechanisms at their disposal. These linguistic choices are also 
socially motivated in a way that a mere cognitive examination might not catch. An 
investigation of the differing levels of the students’ metarepresentative abilities might 
lead to predictions about whether they would use irony or not. However, this would leave 
out the social factors of status and relationship that motivate how a student chooses to 
respond. The findings from the lunchtime recordings will be useful for showing how the 
notions of social status and relationship influence communicative choices. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS FROM LUNCHTIME RECORDINGS 
To investigate pragmatic abilities and interpersonal interactions, this chapter will 
give examples that illustrate the students’ ability to use mechanisms such as echo and 
pretense. The emphasis is to sort and explain how the mechanisms work, while chapter 7 
will sort and explain how the social groups work.  
 Just as there have been challenges in identifying the subgroups of autism (see 
chapter 2), there are challenges in categorizing linguistic phenomena. In the case of 
autism, one challenge is to identify supportable criteria for distinguishing subgroups, 
while noting consistency and commonalities across the groups. The Fifth Edition of the 
Diagnostic Manual chooses to account for the diversity of autism with a spectrum rather 
than various subgroups (such as Asperger’s Syndrome, Kanner’s Syndrome, Rett’s 
Syndrome, and PDD-NOS). Meanwhile, researchers such as Dr. Amaral seek to 
determine appropriate subcategories for the diversity in autism based on observable 
neurological data (see chapter 2). This reshuffling aims not to revolutionize, but to offer 
the most explanatory account of the data. 
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Figure 1. One View of the Autism Spectrum10 
 
 Similarly, there are challenges when categorizing and labeling linguistic 
phenomena. A common option is to have a broad category like “figurative language” and 







                                                 
 




Figure 2. One View of Figurative Language 
 
Alternatively, Relevance Theory chooses to account for the variety of communication 
with one ostensive-inferential process for all communication. Within that, there are 
spectrums with fuzzy boundaries, such as loose-literal and showing-meaningNN (see 
chapter 4). Further, one may approach categorization in terms of mechanisms such as 
lexical broadening, lexical narrowing, and ad hoc concepts. In this chapter I will focus on 
echo and pretense, mechanisms that relate especially to the study of irony comprehension 
in autism. 
6.1 Background for Irony 
Some examples from the lunchtime conversations demonstrate that some students 
with autism can indeed produce and comprehend verbal irony. Because verbal irony is 
defined in a variety of ways in both theoretical literature and common use, it will be 
helpful to present some definitions for a working account of irony. In this study, I will 
rely on the echoic account of irony, the history of which is well summarized in Wilson 
(2013:41).  
Verbal irony has been commonly defined as saying one thing and meaning the 
opposite. Special interpretive procedures were presumed for metaphor as well as irony. In 
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contrast, Relevance Theory holds that there is one interpretive procedure for all 
communication. Therefore, Sperber and Wilson introduced the echoic account of irony in 
1981. A few years later, Clark and Gerrig (1984) proposed the pretense account of irony 
as an alternative. In 1984, Sperber compared the echoic and pretense accounts, defending 
the echoic account but acknowledging that pretense can be combined with echo.  
Wilson gives three distinctive features for verbal irony according to the echoic 
theory: 1) a ‘mocking, scornful or contemptuous’ attitude towards a thought, 2) the 
normative bias, and 3) the ironical tone voice. (Wilson 2013:43). Consider the example, 
“What lovely weather,” uttered on a rainy day. The speaker attributes a scornful attitude 
to the echoed thought that the weather is nice. The normative bias is that sunny weather is 
lovely. A speaker may deliver the utterance with the deadpan tone of voice to indicate the 
scornful attitude, but such prosody is optional (Wilson 2013:47).  
Echoes may be of thoughts, utterances, or other contextual information. Yus 
(2000) has compiled a list of seven types of contextual sources that may be used in ironic 
echo. They include: 1) general factual information about the world, 2) information from 
the physical setting of the conversation, 3) the speaker’s nonverbal communication, 4) 
biographical data about the speaker, 5) mutual knowledge of recent events or actions, 6) 
previous utterances, and 7) lexical/grammatical choices that give linguistic cues that the 
utterance is ironic. Yus points out that often multiple contextual sources may be echoed, a 
leading one with supporting ones (2000:12).  
Echo may take a variety of forms, depending on the attitude attributed to the 
utterance. Wilson (2013:46) writes,  
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The attitudes that can be conveyed in an echoic utterance range from acceptance 
and endorsement of the attributed thought… through various shades of doubt or 
skepticism… to outright rejection…. According to the echoic account, what 
distinguishes verbal irony from other types of echoic use is that the attitude 
conveyed is drawn from the dissociative range: the speaker rejects a tacitly 
attributed thought as ludicrously false (or blatantly inadequate in other ways). 
Though a range of attitudes may be attributed to an echo to form irony, there are 
limits to what counts as irony. Wilson and Sperber summarize, “No irony without an 
ironical attitude, no ironical attitude without an echoed attributed thought as its object” 
(2012:141). This distinction is important, because linguistic literature frequently labels as 
irony utterances that do not use echo. Wilson (2013:54) comments on this tendency,  
I have argued that of the broader range of phenomena commonly treated as forms 
of irony, hyperbole, understatement, rhetorical questions and various forms of 
jocularity or teasing are not inherently ironical, and involve a rather disparate 
range of mechanisms. … By contrast, I have suggested that jocularity, banter and 
teasing may be non-echoic forms of parody or pretence…. 
Thus, the mechanisms deployed in utterances are as important as the classification 
of utterances.  
6.2 Sorting the Spectra 
The confusion of distinguishing and labeling irony and related phenomena calls 
for sorting. Wilson’s approach distinguishes between phenomena and mechanisms; she 
writes, “The goal of a theory is to identify mechanisms and see what range of phenomena 
they explain” (2013:42). The phenomena are the utterances that receive labels such as 
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irony, hyperbole, etc. The mechanisms are what make such phenomena possible. Wilson 
focuses on echo and pretense, while suggesting that there are others that produce 
phenomena often mistaken for irony. 
Often the phenomena that make use of a particular mechanism come on a 
spectrum. I will give a few examples of phenomena witnessed in the classroom to be able 
to prise apart the different mechanisms occurring in each. Focusing on echo and pretense, 
I will explore irony, parody, sarcasm, banter, and then finish with some comments on the 
theme of creativity versus conventionality.  
6.3 Echo versus Pretense 
Pretense and echoing are separate mechanisms, though they may be used together. 
Pretense is commonly used in parody, which exploits “resemblances in behaviour: the 
speaker simulates a speech act, mimicking the tone of voice, form of words, etc. that 
someone genuinely performing that speech act might use” (Wilson 2013:51). While 
parody plays on likeness in behavior, echoic use plays on the likeness of the echoed 
thought or utterance. Thus, both mechanisms may be used together, as in PARODIC IRONY. 
(Wilson 2013:51) 
Prosody helps to signal the echo and pretense. Wilson (2013:51) differentiates 
between REGULAR IRONY, which uses the deadpan tone of voice, and parodic irony, which 
uses the overly enthusiastic tone of voice of pretense and mockery. Regular irony is 
“characterised by a flat or deadpan intonation, slower tempo, lower pitch level and 
greater intensity than are found in the corresponding literal utterances… and is generally 
seen as an optional cue to the speaker’s mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude” 
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(Wilson 2013:45). Meanwhile, the overly enthusiastic tone may be described as “an 
exaggerated tone of enthusiasm or even worship” (Sperber 1984:135).  
This recalls the discussion in chapter 4 of how prosody influences whether 
speaker meaning is weak or strong. The list of options so far includes: the deadpan, the 
overly enthusiastic tone, various subtler shades in between, and even omitting completely 
the prosodic cues. Wharton’s (2009:46) discussion of “showing” behaviors in weak 
communication allows for prosody that gives weak implicatures. Irony makes use of 
weak implicatures, and part of what gives its punch is the lack of obviousness. If the tone 
of voice is crucial in keeping an ironic utterance’s implicatures weak, an overly obvious 
sarcastic tone could reduce the ironic effect. Wilson also asks whether each of the distinct 
tones of voice might “be associated with different conditions of use and give rise to 
subtle differences in interpretation, which would be worth exploring further” (2013:51). 
The following examples demonstrate different conditions of use for the prosody and 
mechanisms.  
6.3.1 Irony (Parodic) 
Example (6) is a mixture of echo and pretense.  
(6) [Student retrieves his backpack from classroom, walks in a nerdy shuffle 
towards the camera, pauses and turns to look at the camera, and says] ‘Hello, yes, 
I’m using the figurative language’ [in an exaggerated nasal, nerdy voice, irony] 
Here, the student uses the mechanism of pretense. He alters his physical demeanor 
in walking towards the camera. He alters his tone of voice in talking to the camera. He is 
not parodying a particular nerdy individual, but nerds in general. It is perhaps an 
exaggerated nerdy version of himself, a humorous persona he occasionally assumes.  
50 
At the same time, his utterance (and possibly even his physical demeanor) is 
echoic. He echoes the thought that he is being studied for his use of figurative language. 
He already knew that I would be studying figurative language as I had made this clear in 
the permission forms and in person with him and his parents. So the thought was manifest 
to both the student and the viewer. 
He attributes a mocking attitude to the echoed thought, mixing it with parody. He 
includes the article ‘the’ in ‘the figurative language.’ This makes it sound like an elusive 
thing that researchers would look for in an exotic population. His attitude mocks this 
thought, and he thereby implies that figurative language is indeed obvious in the 
classroom. At the same time, ‘the figurative language’ sounds like overly technical 
jargon, which fits the nerdy persona he has assumed. He mocks the thought that the 
students are peculiar research subjects by pretending to be one. Further, the act of 
walking up to the camera and looking into it is an ironic act in itself. In what is 
understood to be naturalistic research, there is a mocking attitude in blatantly talking to 
the camera, and thereby the researchers.  
Taking all things together, this communicative act is made up of a variety of 
verbal and non-verbal elements that all contribute to both the attitude and the proposition 
that the student intends to express (Wharton 2009:12). There are both showing and 
meaningNN behaviors (see chapter 4). His tone of voice, blank facial expression, walk, 
slouch, lean, and gaze into the camera, all contribute to his persona, attitude and meaning. 
It is worth noting that he holds his walk and slouch for about one second after his 
utterance, before switching back to his regular walk and posture away from the camera. 
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This indicates that he was indeed “in character” for the duration of his utterance to the 
camera.  
6.3.2 Parody 
Parody uses the pretense mechanism, which may be used separately form irony, 
as in example (7).  
 (7) [Student A is talking to faculty while students B and C are sitting nearby, 
overhearing Student A. Student A has been talking about sports for at least one 
minute straight] 
A: That’s the thing about the Giants. They don’t get a lot of… They did it when 
they won the series way back in 2010… 
[B and C make exaggerated, unintelligible nonspeech vocalizations stereotypical 
of those with lower-functioning autism] 
C: [leans in to B, in a stereotypical autistic voice] (unintelligible)… baseball 
game… 
Students B and C convey a mocking attitude towards the behavior of the student 
who is pontificating about sports. It is not irony, as they do not attribute a mocking 
attitude to an echoed thought. Rather, they use the pretense mechanism to mimic an 
observable behavior. The mocking students share the mutually manifest thought that the 
student pontificating about baseball is exhibiting behavior characteristic of a ‘lower-
functioning’ person with autism. By exaggerating the voice and making it more 
stereotypically ‘autistic’ and unintelligible, they imply that the sports fan is annoying or 
unintelligent. 
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Showing behaviors play a role in this parody. The degree to which their mocking 
speech is unintelligible and stereotypical indicates the degree to which they think the 
student is lower-functioning. Wharton gives a similar example of a girl saying, “You’re 
late!”, for which her “tone of voice and facial expression calibrate the degree of anger her 
audience understands her to feel and to be expressing as part of her meaning” (2009:12). 
Thus, the students use pretense and tone of voice to convey part of their meaning.  
6.3.3 Irony (Regular) 
There were also uses of regular irony.  
 (8) [Three faculty and two students at lunch table, gathered around the laptop 
watching Star Wars] 
Student A: Such beautiful CG[I] for 1976 [irony] 
Faculty A: Well, are you sure it’s not the remastered one? [missing the irony] 
Faculty B: It is. Yeah. 
Student A: That was the funny. 
Faculty A: Oh, sorry. 
Faculty B: ‘Cause all those little things, I don’t think they were there. [referring to 
CGI embellishments] 
Student A: It was all completely necessary [irony] 
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In this case, student A uses at least two instances of regular irony. Though Star 
Wars was released in 197611, the version being shown on the laptop was obviously the 
remastered version with added computer-generated imagery (CGI). Thus, Student A’s 
first use of irony echoes the incorrect thought the original release included beautiful CGI. 
His mild mocking of the thought implies that it is the updated version, not the original, 
and that such CGI did not exist in the 1970s.  
The second use of irony is when he states, “it was all completely necessary.” The 
thought being echoed is that the CGI was necessary. His mocking attitude indicates his 
opinion that additions are superfluous. In both instances of irony, his attitude is that the 
statement he is making is false.  
Context and prosody play a role in these instances of regular irony. Faculty A 
fails to catch the irony because he is on the other side of the computer, thus missing out 
on the contextual information that would have been obvious had he seen the CGI.  
Faculty A also struggles to interpret Student A’s prosody. Student A traditionally 
uses a more mild, monotone voice, and there was only a slight pitch increase on “CG[I]” 
in his utterance. He gives a deadpan delivery, perhaps even omitting prosodic cues 
altogether. Next Student A says, “It was all completely necessary” with approximately 
the same prosody as his first ironic utterance.  
                                                 
 
11 Actually, it was released in 1977. Perhaps the digital effects were applied during 1976. 
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Student A’s statement “That was the funny” is neither echo nor pretense, though it 
has similarities. He delivers his utterance with flat intonation at a perceptibly lower pitch 
level, similar to the tone used for irony. However, his mocking attitude is not towards a 
thought, but towards a teacher. The student mildly mocks the teacher for missing a simple 
instance of irony, not by parodying him but by teasing him. The student uses simpler 
language (“the funny”) to imply that, if the teacher did not understand the instance of 
irony, he might not understand the word either. This is also a good reminder that 
neurotypical teachers may also struggle with ironic language and grasping weak 
implicatures.  
6.4 Irony versus Sarcasm 
The terms irony and sarcasm are often used interchangeably; some, however, 
distinguish them. This situation demonstrates the difficulties of categorization mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter. I will discuss this challenge of categorization and then 
give an example that shows two attitudes attributed to echo—regardless of what label 
they receive. 
Relevance Theory considers sarcasm to be a strong form dissociative echoic use, 
making it a subtype of irony. Muszyńska (2012:241) argues that sarcasm may or may not 
involve echoic use and proposes the following definition: 
Sarcasm - A form of communication which expresses a negative attitude towards 
a person, group of people or society in general by manifesting dissatisfaction and 
intellectual superiority; usually through the witty use of language, language play 
or indirect insult.  
55 
Muszyńska aims to account for utterances for which a speaker does not dissociate herself 
from the thought, but expresses her own negative attitude in line with the thought 
(2012:232). She argues that sarcasm is not a subtype of irony, but that there is often 
blending of their forms and features. Muszyńska proposes the irony-sarcasm continuum 
according to the following chart. 





attributive attributive hurtful 
echoic echoic  
playful  involves a victim, 
most often a specific one 
but can be generally anti-
social 
speaker expresses 
a dissociative attitude 




may not be clear 
speaker's intention 
may not be clear 
unambiguous: the 
meaning communicated 
ostensibly matches the 
implied meaning 
speaker doesn’t 
have to take responsibility 
for negative implicatures 
speaker doesn’t have 
to take responsibility for the 
negative implicature; can 
opt out 
 
 can be used for 
bonding or for establishing a 
position of power 
used for establishing 
a position of power 
  serious, not playful 
 
It is debatable whether or not sarcasm deserves to be defined as separate from irony. 
Muszyńska admits that it is difficult to find examples of what she calls non-echoic 
sarcasm, and that even then, the boundaries are fuzzy (2012:232). The effort to classify 
sarcasm as distinct from irony may mirror the unfruitful effort of past decades to 
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distinguish Asperger’s Syndrome from high-functioning autism (see chapter 2 and 
section 6.1). 
Whether or not non-echoic sarcasm exists, one can still appreciate the range of 
functions from irony to harsher sarcastic echo. Muszyńska (2012:241) summarizes, 
What is important in this is that sarcasm and irony have different functions and 
that pure sarcasm is a form of witty verbal aggression as opposed to ironic 
playfulness. Most typically they are used together, since the humor connected 
with irony, and the lack of responsibility it gives as a non-serious form, mitigate 
the negativity of the sarcastic critique, making it more socially acceptable. 
Example (9) illustrates a range of echoes, from playful irony to aggressive sarcasm. 
 (9) [2 faculty and 3 students at the lunch table, gathered around the laptop 
watching Star Wars. Student A is on the other side of the table, unable to see the 
laptop screen]  
 
1:Student A: Sounds like Family Guy. 
 
2:Faculty A: No, it’s Star Wars actually. It’s not Spaceballs either. 
 
3:Student B: Spaceballs was the best Star Wars movie [irony, joking] 
 
4:Faculty A: Ha. Not the best spoof, it was the best Star Wars movie, period. 
[irony] 
 
5:Student A: [quoting Spaceballs, Sandurz & Helmet concerning a metaphor] 
‘Are we being too literal about this?’ ‘No. He said, he said, he specifically said, 
‘Comb, the desert.’ So we’re combing the desert.’  ‘Did you find anything?’ ‘No, 
sir.’ ‘Did you find anything?’ ‘No, sir—’” 
6:Student B: [to friend Student C, loudly, monotone, sarcastic] It’s funny because 
they say ‘We ain’t found shit.’ 
7:Student A: -- ‘did you find anything?’ ‘Man, we ain’t found shit.’ 
 
8:Student B: Cue laugh track [monotone, irony] 
I will highlight Student B’s three different uses of echo in lines 3, 6 and 8  
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The utterance in line 3 is playful irony. Student B echoes the thought that 
Spaceballs is similar to Star Wars. This humor builds a bond with Faculty A, who also 
responds with playful irony. 
The utterance in line 6 is towards the sarcastic end of the continuum. It is 
aggressive and targets Student A as a victim for being slow. Student B loudly cuts off 
student A before he can finish the quote. Speaker B aims to establish his own position as 
a better conversationalist, and being more adept at making witty comments. 
The utterance of line 8 has an attitude somewhere between those of line 3 and 6. It 
is aggressive in that he targets Student A for taking a long time to quote a movie that 
everyone already knows. However, line 8 is not as aggressive as line 6 because he uses a 
milder tone, lower volume, and does not interrupt Student A as in line 6.  
Student B’s utterances demonstrate the range of echoic attitudes and functions. 
Muszyńska (2012:242) summarizes the benefits of this flexibility: 
The speaker can choose to be more or less direct when expressing critique— from 
direct insult (including foul language), through hostile sarcasm, to mild, teasing 
irony. The choice is also constrained by how these behaviors are perceived 
socially. Not surprisingly, then, ironic sarcasm is used most frequently. With its 
vagueness and playfulness it is the least risky way of expressing dissatisfaction.  
It would be inappropriate for Student B to be any more direct than in line 6. If he were to 
insult the student in front of a teacher more directly, he would get in trouble.  
6.5 Echo, Banter, Pretense  
In brief, banter is defined as mock impoliteness used to express solidarity among 
friends. For example, “Welcome to the party, idiot,” said as a greeting to a friend, would 
58 
rightly be understood as communicating solidarity. Banter uses the pretense mechanism 
for solidarity, while examples (6) and (7) showed how pretense is used in parody and 
parodic irony. Pretense serves different functions, partly based on the context of the 
relationship in which it is used. Thus, Nowik-Dziewicka (2012:250) offers this fuller 
definition of banter: 
Banter occurs in the context of small social distance, power equilibrium and 
mutual liking between the interlocutors when the speaker pretends to be saying 
something impolite in order to reinforce the close relations between the 
interlocutors. 
Though banter may appear in a pure form, it may also be coupled with echoic use 
including irony. Nowik-Dziewicka (2012) gives examples of different combinations. I 
will provide a few examples to illustrate how the students use banter at lunchtime.  
(10a) [Student A has brought two large pizzas to share with the other students, 
while he has his own personal small pizza. A faculty member helps other students 
find plates for their pizza] 
 
Student A: I don’t even have to get a plate. Pffft [sticks tongue out, directs farting 
noises toward his friend, Student B] 
 
(10b) [Faculty A approaches to grab pizza] 
 
Faculty A: Thank you, Student A. I’ll take back some of those things I said about 
you… just some of them, though. 
(10c) [Student C goes to grab a slice of pizza.] 
Student C: Hello, Student A. 
Student A: This one’s mine. Don’t even look at it. [stern, clutches personal pizza] 
Student C: [moves head closer and briefly stares at A’s pizza]  
 (10d) [Student D approaches the counter to pick a piece of pizza, eyes Student 
A’s personal pizza] 
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Student A to Student C: You know, somebody, somebody, is going to get a piece 
of mine, that has “Student A’s personal pizza” written on it [referring to Student D 
as he is getting pizza] 
 
These examples show a variety of functions of banter.  
In (10a), Student A taunts his friend with farting noises the fact that he does not 
have to get his own plate. The pretend boasting works as banter given the small social 
distance, the balance of power, and mutual liking among interlocutors. 
In (10b), Faculty B pretends to be impolite by offering a half-hearted 
reconciliation, just for the sake of receiving pizza. The balance of power is not as equal as 
it is among Students A and C in (10a) but, since Faculty A has an close relationship with 
the student, his utterance counts as banter.  
Example (10c) demonstrates how non-verbal behavior serves banter. Student A 
pretends to be impolite in a few ways: hoarding his pizza, not responding to Student C’s 
greeting, and warning him not to look at his pizza. Student C’s joking ostensive stare at 
the pizza shows that he has correctly understood the element of pretense in A’s banter. C 
responds by starting at A’s pizza. This is non-verbal banter and reinforces solidarity with 
A.  
In (10d), Student A considers Student D outside of his circle of friends. As seen in 
(10a) and (10c), A considers C his equal, Student A continues to pretend to be overly 
possessive of his pizza. This mock impoliteness is directed obliquely to Student C, 
although Student A is referring to Student D. It is a blurrier case, but highlights the role 
of social distance in banter; Student A pretends to be impolite to his friend, but he is 
indeed rude to an outsider. 
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6.6 Creative versus Conventional/Standardized 
The spectrum of creative versus conventional is well known in discussions of 
simile and metaphor (Pilkington 2000; Vega Moreno 2007). However, it also applies to 
other forms such as echoic use. This connection has been hinted at in previous studies. 
Muszyńska (2012:240) comments on the connection between conventional irony and 
metaphor in the following sentence and accompanying footnote:  
Similarly, conventionalized, obviously insincere phrases have such a clear 
speaker's meaning that the amount of perceived irony is minimal. [Footnote: As 
Sperber and Wilson say about some of these common examples like fat chance or 
a precious lot: “the ‘ironical’ interpretations have become grammaticalised to 
such an extent that it is hard to imagine these utterances communicating more 
regular ‘literal’ meanings” (Sperber and Wilson 1998, 287). They refer to them as 
idiomatic ironies and compare them to dead metaphors. They are assigned a 
standard interpretation through [an] automatic interpretative routine and lose their 
ironic force (Sperber and Wilson 1998, 288).] (Muszyńska 2012:240) 
Just as metaphors may become thoroughly conventionalized, so an ironic 
utterance may become so conventionalized that it no longer requires additional 
processing effort to produce cognitive effects. Though easier to understand, they no 
longer prompt the hearer to derive weak implicatures. These “poetic effects”, associated 
with metaphor (see chapter 4), also apply to echo, pretense and banter. Like metaphor, 
these phenomena may be more creative or conventional. There are a few different ways 
that this may happen.  
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First, echoic use allows conveying a variety of attitudes toward an utterance. 
Attitudes from the dissociative range are used in irony. Some attitudes are used more 
frequently than others, resulting in conventional, prototypical irony. Alternatively, 
attributing less common attitudes to an echoed thought makes for creative echoic use.  
Second, adding pretense to echo can make irony more creative. We have already 
seen examples illustrating the difference between regular and parodic irony. In Wilson’s 
(2013:51) words, “[T]here are indeed cases where pretence and irony combine, but far 
from being prototypical cases of irony, they are characterised by a tone of voice quite 
distinct from the regular ‘ironical tone of voice’”.  
Third, the tone of voice itself may be more conventional or creative. Using the 
regular ironic tone of voice can be conventional and blatant. Individuals may seek to be 
creative by using more subtle dissociative tones, as I did while delivering the ironic 
punch line for the story tests. Some students understood the irony even though I used a 
creative tone. Other students did not understand it, though they might have if I had used a 
more obvious tone (see section 5.2.2).  
The creative versus conventional spectrum takes on much more significance at 
lunchtime, where the students group themselves based on the ability to produce and 
comprehend less prototypical and more creative and group-defined uses of echo, pretense 
and banter.  
6.7 Summary 
The lunchtime recordings reveal a variety of irony-related phenomena. Though 
comprehension studies often test prototypical irony, the natural use in context reveals a 
spectrum of phenomena using the echoic and pretense mechanisms. There is a fluidity 
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among each spectrum, as uses are prototypical or more indeterminate. The less 
prototypical uses are similar to creative metaphors in that they yield poetic effects. They 





Chapter 6 discussed some pragmatic mechanisms the students use as they interact 
at lunch. This chapter will give a sociolinguistic analysis of three trends related to the 
students’ pragmatic competence. First, that creative and weak language are preferred 
sociolinguistic variables at lunchtime. Second, that students use these variables to form 
and maintain cliques, and distance themselves from and discriminate against other 
students. Third, that creative utterances become standardized over time, effecting small-
scale language change in the classroom. To begin, I will explain the notion of linguistic 
capital, the framework for most of the sociolinguistic analysis in this chapter.  
7.1 Linguistic Capital 
To speak of linguistic abilities or resources (Bartlett et al. 2005) is more 
courteous than saying deficits. Better still is linguistic capital, because it speaks to the 
value of linguistic resources in a social context.  
Bourdieu (1991) was the first to speak of linguistic capital and linguistic 
marketplaces. In his book Politeness, Watts (2003:147ff) summarizes Bourdieu’s 
thinking about linguistic capital. Bourdieu lists material, cultural, and social resources, 
and linguistic resources. Individuals acquire and exchange these resources in different 
social fields, or marketplaces. For example, a school is a cultural marketplace; a 
friendship group is a social one, and, of course, these may overlap. Language is used in 
all social interaction, so it applies to all marketplaces. Language is a form of cultural and 
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social capital, but one may also look at language in terms of linguistic capital and 
linguistic marketplaces.  
Watts (2003:151-152) gives a few examples of what he considers to be language 
resources that amount to linguistic capital. He suggests “control over language 
varieties…and/or skilled use in a variety of communicative media”. To his list I add 
control of pragmatic phenomena: echo, pretense, ad hoc concepts, and weak 
communication, and perhaps others. 
Watts (2003:151) summarizes the differing comparative value of goods. He 
writes, “Some goods will have a relatively low value in the market while the value of 
others will be relatively high, and the values that are symbolically placed on those goods 
(including money) can fluctuate considerably over time”. Some students place a high 
value on control of pragmatic phenomena. It shapes the language that is used and valued 
within their social groups, as manifested in their interactions at lunch.  
7.2 Preferred Sociolinguistic Variables at Lunch 
People use language not only to communicate, but to shape their identity and 
show group membership. Janet Holmes (2008:137) lists vocabulary, pronunciation, and 
grammatical patterns as elements of language variety by which different social groups 
may be distinguished. William Labov (1972) famously demonstrated that pronunciation 
of the post-vocalic [r] was a marker of social status in New York City.  
This inventory of sociolinguistic variables can be expanded by the rich conceptual 
framework that Relevance Theory provides. The use of pragmatic mechanisms can mark 
status as much as pronunciation and vocabulary. Though many mechanisms may 
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contribute to social status, I will focus on the characteristics of creative and weak 
communication.   
7.2.1 Originality (Creative over conventional) 
This section will show how students who use creative language have a higher 
social status than those who use only conventional language. It will end with an example 
of each type.  
In chapter 5 I mentioned that the metaphor task tested conventional metaphors, 
and that most students passed. Therefore, it did not separate the students into social 
groups. But creative use did. Creative use is most associated with ad hoc concepts in 
metaphor (see chapter 4). Yet creative use also applies to echo, pretense, and banter. Each 
may be more or less creative.  
Creativity is valued for a few reasons. The high intellectual ability needed to 
produce and understand instances of creative use gives it value. Additionally, creative 
uses are often funny and therefore more enjoyable. In a social context where creativity is 
scarce, the symbolic value placed upon creative uses rises.  
The students who consider themselves to be higher-functioning value creativity 
and openly disdain conventional utterances and those who deliver and enjoy them. These 
students express scorn when another student simply quotes a funny video. When a 
handful of students with similar interests in video games, fantasy and movies gather at 
lunch, sharing and repetition is loud and frequent. Students often want to share a Youtube 
video or internet joke that others have already seen multiple times—even if the person 
they invite is not interested. Some of these repeated internet jokes, or memes, require 
little creativity because it is simply copying something. They are uncreative retellings.  
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For this reason, the students who value creativity have coined the exclamation 
“Nice meme!” It is delivered in a stereotypical autistic voice as a parody of a lower 
functioning individual who is too easily entertained. Though it likely originated 
spontaneously while mocking an unoriginal online joke, it is now a shorthand way of 
mocking unoriginal material and those amused by it. A sampling is given below. 
 (11a) [Two students are browsing the web, when their friend returns] 
Student A: (unintelligible speech in mock, stereotypical autistic voice) 
Student B to C: Student C, you missed out on our ‘nice meme’ run 
Student B: [browsing web] There was a great meme. Nice meme. Nice meme. 
Looks to be a great meme. Memes all around.  
 (11b) [during more web browsing] 
Student A: nice meme… [to Student B] You’ll never be respected as a ‘nice 
memer’ if you don’t say ‘nice meme,’ if you don’t write ‘nice meme’ on every 
single ‘nice meme’ you ever come across online [Students B and C laugh]  
(11c) [during more web browsing] 
Student B: Student A’s favorite meme… wow, look how polymer it is (?) 
Student A: I wanna see the crusty meme [referring to Student B’s computer] 
Student B: crusty [laugh] autism. [laugh] 
These students creatively use echo, banter and pretense. Their joking hinges on 
their disdain for memes and those who truly enjoy them. They come up with many 
variations of ‘nice meme.’ Though there is repetition, it is creative. They enjoy these 
creative uses, as they laugh and repeat. 
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In contrast, the example below shows repetition that does not require creativity. 
Some students are amused by a conventional stimulus. Others are not. 
 (12) [Students and one faculty member are gathered at the lunch table. Student A 
plays crude quotes from a Stepbrothers soundboard on his tablet computer. 
Students A and B laugh loudly] 
Faculty A: Hey Student A, let’s choose something that doesn’t have cussing on it 
[Student A repeats the quotes they just listened to] 
[Student A shows Student B another game on his tablet, with loud volume.] 
Student B: sounds like Saints’ Row. That’s a hell of a lot like Watchdogs, too. 
[Faculty A again tells Student A to turn it down. Two other students at the table 
are quiet the whole time.] 
Here, two students are entertained by simple repetition of funny movie quotes, 
often involving cussing. The students do not themselves create new witty humor. Instead, 
Student B responds with more movie references. For this reason, they appear to lack the 
valued social status. The two other students remain silent, thereby distinguishing 
themselves from the students who are loudly enjoying the quotes.   
These examples suggest that in this community social status is established in part by 
the creative or the conventional end of the spectrum. All students pass a comprehension 
test for conventional forms, but only the creative ones are socially esteemed.   
7.2.2 Weaker Communication Allowing more Implicatures 
This section will explain that weak communication is also valued and brings 
social status. It suggests a connection between weak communication and speaker volume. 
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As mentioned in chapter 3, weak communication is that which encourages the 
hearer to entertain an array of weak implicatures. Strong communication gives 
explicatures and more closely limits the implicatures a hearer may infer. A strong 
utterance may be easier for all to understand, but it is less rewarding when little 
processing effort is required. Additionally, strong utterances are not as fun as they limit 
exploration of potential implicatures. They are not special because anyone can understand 
them. The additional cognitive processing effort one might go through to find creative 
implicatures from an ambiguous utterance is worth it, somewhat like the pleasure of 
understanding difficult poetry.  
In the lunchtime linguistic marketplace, the ability to produce and understand 
weak communication gives social status. Students who can consistently employ and 
enjoy weak implicatures share a solidarity. Those who are unable to do so remain outside 
the group. This happens for both cognitive and social reasons: cognitive because some 
students are unable to understand the weak implicatures, and social because those inside 
the group decide to not incorporate those students into their group. 
It is worth noting that the strong-weak communication continuum correlates with 
loud versus soft volume. During lunch the students who use weak language tend to speak 
more quietly, and the students who use strong language are much louder in volume. 
There are two reasons. First, the concept of scalar ostension holds that speakers may wish 
to be less than optimally relevant towards certain audiences (see chapter 4). For example, 
it is natural to whisper an inside joke or insult to a friend while in the presence of 
outsiders. Second, if the majority of the students in the room are speaking loudly, 
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speaking softly will set one apart. In this way, choice of volume is a sociolinguistic 
variable, and speaking with low volume is preferred.  
7.3 Social Functions of Linguistic Capital 
This section will show the way students use linguistic capital to form and navigate 
groups. I begin with the terminology of Watts and Bourdieu before moving to examples.   
Bourdieu and Watts provides helpful vocabulary for what occurs at lunchtime. 
First, each student has his own habitus or “set of dispositions to act in certain ways, 
which generates cognitive and bodily practices in the individual” (Watts 2003:149). The 
linguistic habitus for the students is their disposition to use their linguistic capital in the 
linguistic marketplace. Second, over time those in a latent network are revealed as an 
emergent network. Watts explains, “socio-communicative verbal interaction entails the 
establishment, reestablishment and reproduction of social links between the interactants, 
which emerge during the interaction” (2003:154). In the classroom, some students will 
establish and reestablish social links based on pragmatic competence. Third, over time 
these emergent networks will establish the politic behavior for their group. Politic 
behavior is “the linguistic and non-linguistic behavior that the group determines to be 
appropriate for ongoing social interaction” (Watts 2003:276). In the emergent network in 
the classroom, the politic behavior includes most prominently creative and weak 
communication, and in some instances, softer volume.  Consistent use of this linguistic 
capital becomes the appropriate behavior for group membership. 
The emergent network in the classroom maintains their politic behavior by using 
linguistic capital to keep some in and others out. In other words, they use negative and 
positive identity practices. Negative identity practices range from blatant discrimination 
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to subtle distancing of other students. Positive identity practices range from inviting 
students into the group, and increasing and maintaining solidarity within the group. Both 
positive and negative identity practices often happen concurrently, so there will be some 
overlap in the examples given below.   
7.3.1 For Distancing from Other Students 
  This section illustrates the range of negative identity practices employing 
linguistic capital. The first example is of blatant discrimination, followed by two 
examples of social distancing. First, discrimination.  
 (13) [One faculty member and three students (including B and C, in a clique) are 
sitting at the table when Student A arrives.] 
Student A: Pizza! 
Faculty A: What’s up A? Yeah, you can have a piece. 
Student B: What? No, no.  
Faculty A: [laughs] Well, I think it’s there (for everyone). 
Student B: Faculty B said he couldn’t. [lying/kidding] 
 Faculty A: Oh really? 
Student B: Yeah 
Student C: It’s the law. 
Faculty A: Well, A, check with Faculty B first. [Student A leaves] 
Student C: [smirking laugh noise] 
Faculty A: Apparently there’s a ‘Student A’ clause.  
Student C: The Allied Republic of uh, Better Autisms has decided for the better 
well-being of everyone else and has disallowed access 
Faculty A: Well—I mean, it’s not like he’s gonna drool on it. 
Student B: No, it’s not that. 
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In this situation, the clique excludes Student A while joking the whole time. Even 
if Student B is telling the truth, that Faculty B had indeed revoked Student A’s pizza 
privileges (presumably for discipline), Student B elsewhere excludes Student A and 
identifies with Student C. In their group, creative humor is the politic behavior. Student C 
jokes that “it’s the law”, laughs when Student A has to check for permission, and gives a 
joking title for his friend group.  
The emergent network also demonstrates ease with weak implicatures. They 
understand and them and respond in kind. Faculty A has echoed Student C’s law theme 
by positing the ‘Student A’ clause. He does so in a dissociative way, implying mild 
disapproval of the discrimination. Student C responds with a mildly joking justification—
a decision from “The Allied Republic of uh, Better Autisms.” Thus, Student C grasps the 
weakly implied law theme and Faculty A’s mild disapproval.  
Their self-designation of “better autisms” is also creative and gives weak 
implicatures. Though it is not the first time he has used “autisms,” it is creative because 
he chooses the ungrammatical “autisms” rather than “autistic people.” It weakly implies 
self-deprecation for improper grammar, for identifying with students he considers 
beneath him, and for the impropriety of asserting superiority. The label also hints at 
insensitive, even offensive misanalysis, evoking the history of autism research that has 
not been able to do justice to the complexity of individuals on the spectrum. The related 
terms “autistics” or “autistic individuals” are eschewed today in favor of people-first 
language such as “individuals with autism.” These layers of implicatures form the 
background of the discrimination against Student A, whether he realizes it or not. 
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The next example shows distancing by non-response and a nonsense answer.  
(14) [Student A is looking for plates while Students B and C, in a clique, already 
have theirs] 
Student A: Where are the paper plates? [to B and C] Where’d you guys get the 
paper plates?  
Student B: [pause. Focuses on laptop.] yes [A ignores B, maybe thinks B is 
unintelligent] 
Student B attempts to hide from Student A by not responding to his initial 
question. Student B’s ignoring is ostensive, communicating disassociation from Student 
A. When questioned directly, B attempts to maintain a non-response by focusing on his 
laptop. But after A waits long enough for a response, B switches to a nonsense answer of 
“yes” for what was not a yes-no question. It is a creative, weaker use of language that 
requires that A do more inferencing than a straight answer. Whether or not A understands 
the implications, B has sought to keep A at a distance through his language use.   
The next exchange goes further than a nonsense answer, using creative and weak 
language in a variety of mechanisms to ward off two outsiders, one absent and one 
present. 
 (15) [Two students are watching a live space shuttle feed on the laptop computer 
when their friend Student A arrives. Student C is at the table to the side, outside of 
their clique. Student D is not present, as he has graduated.] 
Student A: really stupid… who even likes space? [sarcastic] 
Student B: [changes view on computer] there, isn’t that better? 
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A:  [pretending to be impressed by it] ah, ah… euh! [A leans progressively closer 
to B and makes a the final grunt directly into his ear. The grunt mimics a filler 
noise that Student D frequently made.]  
B: no! [leans away and laughs] Leave us, Ghost of Student D! 
Student C: [loudly, different voice] spare him! Please spare him, Lord! 
A: [leaning in to repeat unintelligible autism noises in B’s ear] 
C: please spare him, Lord A.  
B: [pauses, ignores C, then referring to the computer, asks A] why’d the sun turn 
off? 
Students A and B first distance themselves from the absent Student D with a 
pretense use of his speech filler, “euh.” They had previously joked about this habit of his, 
so a single ‘euh’ was enough to trigger resonances with their mutual cognitive 
environments. The ‘euh’ grunt itself weakly implicates in a creative way. It is not a 
typical direct parody. Student A does not impersonate D with exaggerated repetition of 
‘euh’. Instead, the ‘euh’ is spontaneously delivered after two ‘ah’s in succession, when a 
third ‘ah’ is expected. The accompanying lean towards Student B’s ear contributes to the 
indirect parody of Student D. This nonverbal behavior alludes to Student D’s perceived 
intrusions, when he would recite stories from video games at length to uninterested 
audiences. The plea “No! Leave us, Ghost of Student D” further seals the distancing of D 
from the students joking about him. 
After distancing themselves from an absent student, the emergent network rejects 
the presence of Student C. He attempts to join in, but he does not exhibit appropriate 
politic behavior. First, his utterance “Please spare him, Lord” is too conventional. It could 
74 
seemingly have been lifted from a period piece or video game. It fails to interact with the 
actual content of the students’ utterances and shows that Student C did not actually 
understand who they were joking about. Thus, he had misunderstood the weak 
communication and evidenced a lack of linguistic capital. Second, he spoke at a much 
higher volume than the others. Third, his interrupting their discussion was all too 
reminiscent of Student D. They distanced him through silent treatment and Student B’s 
change of topic. 
It is worth noting a distinction in methods of distancing, between sociolinguistic 
variables and other mechanisms. Chapter 6 discussed how sarcasm can distance by being 
hurtful towards a victim and establishing a position of power for the speaker. This is a 
direct way to discriminate and distance. Parodies, insults, and jokes may fulfill a similar 
role. These may be conventional and have strong explicatures. In contrast, the preferred 
variables of creativity and weakness establish distance in a more complex ways. This is 
done by using linguistic capital that those outside the clique do not have. This use may be 
subtle or blatant. The notion of scalar ostension applies here, as at different times 
speakers may intend to display more or less obviously their linguistic capital. Thus, the 
sociolinguistic variables offer a subtle and consistent way of maintaining group cohesion, 
particularly when the variables themselves entail subtlety, as in the case of creative and 
weak communication.  
7.3.2 For Maintaining Cliques 
The counterpart to keeping others out of a group is maintaining solidarity within. 
This section provides two examples of positive identity practices including mock autistic 
behaviors and echoic self-reference. 
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The first example demonstrates the solidarity of the clique.  
 (16) [Students are gathering in the room as Faculty A starts recording. One 
student in the background is pontificating about video games to no particular 
audience, while other students are considering leaving the classroom.] 
Student A: …better place across the hall 
Student B: [groaning sound] but how will Faculty A research your random figures 
of speech?  
Faculty A: ha. oh you guys don’t have to. You just do wherever you’re 
comfortable.  
[Students A and B pack up to leave] 
Student A: buh, buh, buh, buh [making mock atypical nonspeech vocalizations 
characteristic of those with lower-functioning autism, possibly reacting to being 
studied as a subject with ASD] 
Student B: [makes noises similar to those of Student A] one of us, one of us [in a 
mock desperate voice, referring to Student C] 
Students A, B and C leave the room 
Student D: become one of us [in growling voice] join us, join us… 
Of the many methods used here to maintain the solidarity of the clique, the most 
creative is the mock, atypical, nonspeech vocalizations of A and B. The sounds are 
characteristic of those with lower-functioning autism, not of Students A and B. 
Nevertheless, they adopted the noises (which they elsewhere dubbed “autisming”) as an 
inside joke. Here, their use weakly implies both a reaction to being studied as subjects 
with ASD, and the fact that they themselves understand the irony of having autism and 
76 
acting more autistic. This is a case of scalar ostension, as Student A intends to be heard 
mainly by Student B, but also possibly by the researcher and on the video recordings.  
“Autisming” is not the only way the students joke about having autism in one 
sense, yet remaining separate from others with autism. The creative self-referential use of 
autistic characteristics is a common theme in this emerging social network. The following 
example illustrates a similar use of an autistic label. 
 Example (17) [Students are talking about another class, and who will be in their 
next class period] 
Student A: no, I’m not 
Student B: all by yourself except for [Simon]. [Gary] doesn’t count as a person…  
Student A: he’s not even autistic; of course he doesn’t count 
Student B: that old blop-glod teacher with the bulbous multitude of chins is here. 
[the substitute] that you like. The one who knows about gams. [gasp]. How could 
you, Student A? 
Faculty A: is he old old? 
Student A: he’s old enough… he’s kind of like a plastic bag full of tapioca 
Students A and B demonstrate solidarity by setting themselves apart from 
neurotypical individuals. The description discounting another student as ‘not even 
autistic’ indicates that Students A and B have appropriated the label ‘autistic’ for 
themselves. This complements the instances when they distance themselves from others 
that share their austistic labels, such as in (13) and (16). Thus, their use of ‘autistic’ and 
related terms is at different times broadened or narrowed in the ad hoc concepts. 
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Such labels are also often instances of echoic use. Bianchi (2014) explains how an 
ethnic community may use a racial slur in an echoic way, attributing to it a different 
attitude than the one originally intended. For example, some African Americans use the 
n-word for solidarity within the community, rather than as a contemptuous term from 
without. Similarly, the label ‘autistic,’ while not a slur, can have a negative 
connotation—whether as an inadequate clinical diagnosis, or a term that fails to 
appreciate the diversity of the community, or as a label that misrepresents an individual. 
In (17), Student A projects the attitude that ‘autistic’ friends are worth hanging out with, 
while those who are not autistic will be insufficiently fun to hang out with during the next 
class period. 
In addition to the labels, (17) shows the continuing politic behavior of creative 
and weak uses. “Like a plastic bag full of tapioca” is a creative simile referring to the 
substitute teacher. The onomatopoeic description of him as “blop-glod” weakly evokes, 
leaving much to the imagination. The description of him as “the one who knows about 
gams” is creative, and weakly implies that he is old enough to use a term for a woman’s 
legs that Americans have not used for a few decades. Thus, the students not only have the 
linguistic capital to create and grasp implicatures, but they enjoy it as an expression of 
their group.  
7.4 Diachronic Standardization of Creativity 
This section will show that over time individual uses of creative and weak language 
become standardized not only as habitus and politic behavior for the emergent network, 
but also for language change within the community.  
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7.4.1 Wharton’s O-continuum and Language Change 
Tim Wharton’s investigation of verbal and non-verbal communication shows that 
utterances “typically involve a mixture of strong and weak communication, with non-
verbal behaviour generally contributing to the weaker side” (Wharton 2009:191). 
Wharton proposes the showing-meaningNN continuum to account for the “role played in 
ostensive communication by the inferential attribution of intentions” (2009:172). He also 
calls the showing-meaningNN continuum “an Ostensive behaviour-continuum, or an O-
continuum.”  (2009:172).  
Wharton shows that “In the O-continuum the same stimulus can occupy different 
points depending on how it is used” (2009:173). Language typically intended to meanNN 
may also display. Wharton gives the example of a person intending to communicate that 
he has a sore throat by saying in a very hoarse voice: “The moon looks beautiful tonight” 
(2009:173). On the other hand, displays may be used to meanNN—in some conventional 
sense. Wharton gives the example in which a girl “uses a shiver [a sign that is not usually 
used ostensively] to meanNN that she does not want to stay outside (2009:174). In each of 
these cases, the same stimulus can be used in ways that fall in different points on the O-
continuum, from showing to meaningNN.  
Additionally, the O-continuum allows for the description of language change over 
time. Wharton writes: 
[S]ince we have a continuum in which a given item can occupy different points 
depending on how it is used, we would expect some expressions to move along it 
as a result of being frequently used in one way or another. In historical terms, 
when an interjection, for example, moves far enough along the continuum, it may 
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become linguistically productive (‘to wow’, ‘yucky’), and some of its uses may be 
properly linguistic (verbs, adjectives etc.). This suggests a historic, diachronic 
dimension to the continuum. (2009:174).  
Wharton then continues on how the O-continuum could help explain language change. 
[I]t can represent the fluidity and constant change that results in expressions 
coming to form part of language. In many historical linguistic accounts (Aitchison 
1991, Lightfoot 1991), children are seen as converging on the simplest grammar 
that reflects the practice of the speech community to which they are exposed. The 
O-continuum could allow us to explore the idea that pragmatic factors may affect 
this convergence, and to see language change in terms of the micro-processes 
involved in the emergence of new encoded meanings. Language change might 
then be characterised in terms of population-scale macro-processes resulting from 
an accumulation of those micro-processes, leading to the stabilization of new 
senses. It is also plausible that interactions between cognitive and social factors 
might influence the direction of linguistic change (2009:174-175). 
I will now show examples from the lunchtime recordings of Wharton’s proposal that 
micro-processes result in new encoded meanings.  
7.4.2 Examples of Lunchtime Language Change 
In section 7.3 I indicated that the habitus of individuals spreads over time to 
become the politic behavior of the emergent network. At the same time, individual micro-
level creative uses of language result in new encoded meanings, at least for the emergent 
network. These new encoded meanings may not spread on a macro-level to a population 
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outside the classroom, but they demonstrate the diachronic change in a small speech 
community. The most noteworthy examples are “autisming” and “nice meme.”   
The “autisming” noises follow Wharton’s suggested pattern of interjections that 
become linguistically productive. The true nonspeech vocalizations are in one sense 
interjections. The interjection quality would still apply the first time a student performed 
“autisming” to mock a perceived lower-functioning individual. Through repeated uses 
over time its verbal meaning and form stabilized, in the emergent network. The fact that 
they coined the term “autisming” to describe the practice further suggests its 
development. Further, it was repeated often enough for it to become a prominent resource 
for echo and pretense, as in example (16). 
As Wharton suggests, both cognitive and social factors have led to this 
stabilization. (2009:174). The first cognitive factor is the diversity of cognitive ability 
characteristic of individuals with autism. Some make atypical nonspeech vocalizations, 
while others communicate fluently. Some struggle with inferring intentions, while others 
understand and use weak implicatures regularly. Second, some students had the cognitive 
ability to notice these differences and think of ways to joke about them, including the 
mocking use of atypical nonspeech vocalizations. Meanwhile, two social factors 
contribute: the social setting of the variety of individuals in one place, and the desire of 
some to distance themselves from others. This led to the pretense use of “autisming” for 
distancing, as well as solidarity among those who used it in jest. Over time, it became a 
stabilized phenomenon in the local speech community. 
The same social and cognitive factors that led to the stabilization of “autisming” 
led to the stabilization of “nice meme.” An additional environmental factor contributed to 
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its stabilization, namely, the availability of technology. Computers, cell phones, and 
tablets facilitated access to and communication about online material. Some students 
enjoyed this repetition; others found it irritating.  
The stabilized use of “nice meme” fits well with Wharton’s proposal that one 
utterance may vary in its placement on the showing-meaningNN continuum. In the 
emergent network, “nice meme” is comparable to an inside joke. At the same time, “nice 
meme” serves as an interjection, similar to “yuck.” When looking at actual memes to 
make fun of the memes, the students use “nice meme” in an ironic meaningNN sense. At 
other times, when making a parody of another individual, “nice meme” serves more of a 
displaying function. In both ways, whether as an inside joke or as an interjection, “nice 
meme” becomes a stabilized entry. The emergent network then uses this entry to meanNN 
and to show.  
7.5 Summary 
The creative and weak uses of language at lunchtime are the valued variables. 
Students who regularly exploit this linguistic capital find themselves to be members of an 
emergent network, contributors to its politic behavior. Additionally, they take part in the 
development of language change on a small scale. However, they may also choose to 
exploit such linguistic capital in a negative way to distance and discriminate themselves 




This thesis has explored the cognitive abilities and social contexts of one group of 
students with autism spectrum disorders. The students’ responses, conversations, and 
behaviors display a complexity of the participants that cannot be reduced to 
metarepresentational deficit or even ability, much less a numbered score. In my case, to 
say that the participants cannot be described by numbers alone is both ironically and 
literally true. My initial efforts for a reliable quantitative element from four story 
questions were inconclusive. However, they did bring to light the nuances of the creative-
conventional spectrum, weak communication as seen in prosody, and social factors that 
influence a student’s responses even on a standardized comprehension task. 
I have also sought to show that just as metaphors fall on a continuum from 
creative to conventional, and from giving weak to strong implicatures, so also do the uses 
of echo, pretense, and prosody. Testing metaphor comprehension is significantly colored 
by how creative the metaphors are. So also, understanding and appreciating verbal irony 
depends on how creative the irony is. The weak implicatures of prototypical irony are 
often stronger than other shades of dissociative echo. 
It is well established that weak implicatures make for better poetry and humor. 
This study also points to the power of constructions with weak implicatures to include 
and exclude people in a social setting. The classroom context allows us to see the abilities 
for creative and weak communication as the preferred sociolinguistic variables. Further, 
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this linguistic capital and the habitus of individuals develop the politic behavior for an 
emergent network. This linguistic capital is used to keep some in and others out, and can 
even result in creating new stabilized lexical senses involving pretense and echo. 
The findings in this study have implications for how researchers, teachers, and 
clinicians approach classifying and exploring linguistic abilities of individuals autistic 
and neurotypical. The lunchtime setting is one of many contexts that helps to remind us 
that linguistic abilities are linguistic capital, and that individuals and groups can have 
different motivations and aims for how they use their resources. 
Based on my findings, I point to one area in need of further research. The field of 
pragmatics is developing by including sociological aspects, but there is a need for 
exploring the affective, noncognitive dimensions of language. Nobel Prize-winning 
cognitive scientist Daniel Kahneman (2011:12) writes of recent decades’ work on our 
understanding of human behavior and motivation: “An important advance is that emotion 
now looms larger in our judgments and choices than it did in the past… judgments and 
decisions are guided directly by feelings of liking and disliking, with little deliberation or 
reasoning.” Since most human action is not motivated by deliberate, rational thought, the 
centrality of the noncognitive and affective should become more prominent in an 






METAPHOR TEST QUESTIONS (NORBURY 2005) 
Example of item and foil choices. The correct answer is underlined. 
The heating had been left on overnight and the room was very warm.  
(a) synonym:  It was:  hot   a blanket  a grill   spicy 
(b) simile: It was like:  an oven a blanket  a grill  a spice 
(c) metaphor: It was:       an oven     a blanket         a grill          a spice 
 
Note: In the simile condition, the carrier phrase ended with the word ‘like’
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Sentence Stimuli Synonym Metaphor Foil 1 Foil 2 Foil 3 
Simon had been walking in 
the snow for hours. His feet 
were 
freezing ice shoes sweaty snowflakes 
The tree in my garden has 
grown a lot this year. It is 
tall a tower A leaf long A castle 
Mum left the bread out 
overnight. This morning it 
was 
hard a brick milk A pebble hot 
My school friend always 
protects me from bullies. He 
is 
brave a soldier A bully smart broad 
Laura talks so softly you can 
barely hear her. She is  
quiet a mouse quick A cat A phone 
Jen always gets good marks 
on her exams. She is 
clever a professor A hand A coach A pen 
Father was very cross when I 
got home late. He was 
angry a volcano A mountain A board A clock 
Peter can lift very heavy 
weights with no problem. He 
is  
strong an ox A goat healthy A barbell 
Our new school is very big 
and I always get lost. It is  
confusing a maze A map A string A web 
Julie's long fingernails were 
painted red and gold. They 
were 
colourful jewels toes drawings rings 
Lou was always happy and 
made everyone feel good. He 
was 
cheerful the sun A doctor grass clear 
Pat has very long and smooth 
hair. It is 
straight spaghetti fuzzy A brush macaroni 
Joe spent too long in the 
swimming pool. He was 
wrinkled a prune A ruby A plum A float 
Sam's new pet dog is very 
big. It is 
huge an elephant round A house A turtle 
 Louise had been shouting 
and crying for hours. She was  
upset a storm A rainbow shocked A fire 
The heating was on for hours 
and the room was warm. It 
was 
hot an oven A blanket A spice A grill 
Kate had a lovely face and 
pretty eyes. She was 
beautiful a painting A mirror A statue nosy 
Julian was hiding behind the 
tree and not moving. He was 




STORY TEST EXAMPLES (KALAND 2002) 
I used four stories from Kaland (2002). I modified the vocabulary slightly to fit my 
audience or American participants. There were many comprehension questions that 
accompanied each story, but I have only included the questions that were most pertinent 
to assessment of physical and mental inferences.  
5a) The robbery (tests comprehension of double bluff) 
 
One late, dark autumn evening the 14-year-old Paul is going along some scary town streets  
with his mother. They are both a little afraid, because they have heard and read of people who  
have been robbed of their money in this area.  
 
 Earlier that day Paul’s mother has been to the bank and made a withdrawal of $1400.  
She has placed the money in an inside coat pocket instead of in her handbag. Her old washing  
machine broke down for good a couple of days ago, and she has to buy a new one in one of  
the coming days. Paul doesn’t know that his mother has earlier been to the bank and made a  
withdrawal.  
 
 Suddenly, two masked men, each with their own firearm, emerged from a dark side street  
and shouted: "Hands up, this is a robbery! Where is the money, old lady?" Paul’s mother takes  
a real chance and says that she has hidden the money in an inside pocket. The robbers snatch  




4. Why has she been to the bank and made a withdrawal? (PI)  
5. Why does she place the money she has taken out in an inside pocket?  
8. Why does Paul’s mother say that she has hidden the money?  
9. Is what Paul’s mother says true? YES/NO/DON´T KNOW  
10. Why do the robbers take her handbag and not her hat?  
11. Why does Paul’s mother say that the money is in an inside pocket, where she has really hidden it, and  
not in her handbag? (MI)  
 
6 a) Tidying the room (tests comprehension of irony) 
 
Tom and Adrian are brothers. Tom is 8 years old and Adrian is 14. Their mother is very strict  
and always makes sure that their rooms are tidy. One day she says that they must both tidy up  
their rooms. Tom, the youngest of the brothers, is always making a mess, and his room is  
usually very untidy. His mother often complains about the mess. Adrian seldom has to hear 
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such remarks, but his mother says that he should occasionally help his father tidying their  
villa garden.  
 
 Both Tom and Adrian go to their rooms to begin tidying. After a while their mother  
shouts and asks if they will soon be finished. Adrian replies that he is finished. 
 
 But, eight-year-old Tom hasn’t began to tidy up at all! Adrian’s mother asks if he can  
look in Tom’s room to check if he has tidied up. Adrian opens the door to Tom’s room, peers  
in and sees that the room appears as it normally does. He shouts to his mother: "Mother, Tom  




5. How does Tom’s room look?  
6. How does Adrian’s room look? (PI)  
10. Do you think Tom has tidied up his room? YES/NO/DON´T KNOW  
11. Adrian says to his mother that Tom has as usual done a splendid job tidying up. Is what he says true?  
YES/NO/DON´T KNOW  
12. Why does Adrian say this? (MI)  
 
 
11 b) The wrong orange juice (test comprehension of lack of consideration for other people’s feelings) 
 
On the way home from work one Friday afternoon in the middle of rush hour Kent’s mother  
experiences problems with her car. It breaks down and she has to be towed home. As usual on  
Fridays after work she has been to Wal-Mart to buy her groceries for the weekend.  
Unfortunately, Kent’s favorite orange juice is sold out on this particular Friday. Instead  
Kent’s mother buys normal orange juice with real fruit bits.  
 
 Kent’s mother says that she is very tired in the body and has shoulder pains. The last few  
weeks she has had to work over-time, and arrives home from work late in the evening.  
Because of the pain she hasn’t slept very well at night. Kent listens to what his mother says,  
but is unhappy that dinner, which he is usually served at 5 p.m., is delayed by several hours.  
 
 Kent helps his mother as usual in unpacking the groceries and putting them in the fridge.  
While he is doing this he discovers that his mother hasn’t bought his favorite juice, but  
another brand of orange juice instead. He therefore fetches his mother’s jacket and says: "If  
you hurry, you will make it to Gerbe’s before it closes in half an hour. I know that they have  
Mills Orange Juice".  
 
 Kent’s mother becomes extremely angry when she hears this and shouts in desperation:  
"You think only of yourself Kent!" Kent, who only wanted his favorite juice, is quite  




1. What happens to Kent’s mother on the way home from work on Friday afternoon?  
2. Where has Kent’s mother bought her groceries for the weekend?  
3. Why can’t she buy Kent’s favorite juice?  
4. Why on this particular Friday evening is Kent’s mother tired with shoulder pains? (PI)  
5. What does Kent think about his dinner not being served at the usual time?  
6. With what does Kent help his mother?  
7. What does he discover as he puts the groceries into the fridge?  
8. Why does Kent go and fetch his mother’s coat?  
9. Is Kent’s mother angry on hearing his suggestion that she should go to Gerbe’s to buy his favorite juice?  
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YES/NO/DON´T KNOW  
10. Why is Kent so surprised that his mother becomes angry just because he would like to have his favorite 
juice? (MI)  
 
 
12 b) The heavy bag (test comprehension of mistaken intentions) 
 
Tina and Charlotte are in the 2nd grade at school; they are friends and often go to school  
together. Tina has been to the library and borrowed many books, so her school bag is very  
heavy. Her arm becomes very tired with the weight. Charlotte on the other hand, has not been  
to the library today. In her backpack she has only her pencil case and two notebooks. 
 
 Charlotte is a kind and helpful friend, especially when she understands that somebody  
needs her help. But, she doesn’t say so much. 
 
 Just before they are to begin going home Tina says: "Can you wait a moment for me by  
this flag pole, while I go to the bathroom?" "Yes", says Charlotte, "I can". But, Charlotte doesn’t  
wait for Tina, and when Tina comes out from the bathroom, Charlotte has already begun going  
home. Tina runs after her as fast as she can, while carrying the heavy bag in her right hand.  
After a while when she catches up with Charlotte she says: "You promised to wait for me,  
why did you just go?", asks Tina. But, Charlotte just looks in a questioning manner.  
 
 Tina is now very tired in her arm and says to Charlotte: "Can you carry my bag?" "Yes, I  
can", replies Charlotte. Tina stops and waits for Charlotte to take her bag, but Charlotte just  




2. Why is Tina’s school bag heavy today?  
3. Why is Charlotte’s rucksack light to carry? (PI)  
9. Why does Tina want Charlotte to carry the heavy school bag?  
10. Why doesn’t Charlotte stop to take Tina’s bag when Tina’s arm is so tired? (MI) 
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